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A major cause of the quality and cost problems in health care today is that pay-
ment systems encourage volume-driven health 
care rather than value-driven health care . Under 
current payment systems, physicians, hospitals 
and other health care providers have strong 
financial incentives to deliver more services to 
more people but are often financially penal-
ized for providing better services and improving 
health . Research has shown that more services 
and higher spending do not result in better 
outcomes; indeed, they often produce exactly 
the opposite result .
Fortunately, many people now believe that 
there are better ways to pay for health 
care—ways that give health care providers 
more responsibility for increasing quality and 
controlling costs of services without penalizing 
them financially for treating sicker patients. 
“Episode-of-care payment” systems involve 
paying a single price (a “case rate”) for all of 
the services needed by a patient for major 
acute episodes, such as a heart attack or a hip 
replacement, regardless of which providers 
are involved instead of multiple fees for each 
specific service provided. “Risk-adjusted global 
fee” and “condition-specific capitation” systems 
go a step further, paying health care provid-
ers a single fee for all of the outpatient care 
needed by their patients, particularly those 
with chronic diseases, in ways that reward the 
providers for keeping their patients healthy and 
for reducing duplicative and unnecessary health 
care services . (For more detail about these 
new payment systems, see “Better Ways to Pay 
for Healthcare” by Harold D . Miller, a report 
prepared for the 2008 Summit on Healthcare 
Payment Reform convened by the Network 
for Regional Healthcare Improvement and a 
part of the NRHI Healthcare Payment Reform 
Series .)
Implementing these kinds of improvements in 
payment systems holds significant promise for 
improving the quality and reducing the cost of 
health care . But there are a number of impor-
tant issues that need to be addressed and a 
variety of challenges that need to be overcome 
in order to move these improvements from 
concept to reality . In particular : 
 Which health care providers, if any, are able 
and willing to accept new payment struc-
tures and deliver value-based care? 
 How should the use of high-value providers 
and services be encouraged? What protec-
tions are needed to ensure appropriate 
quality for patients? 
 How can payers and providers be encour-
aged to participate in new payment and 
delivery systems? How similar do different 
payers’ systems need to be?
 What kinds of pilot projects are needed to 
test new payment systems?
 What community-wide structures are 
needed to support payment reform? 
More than 100 health care leaders from 
across the country—physicians; hospital 
administrators; health plan executives; aca-
demics; foundation leaders; regional coalition 
directors; federal, state and local government 
officials; executives of health care quality im-
provement organizations; and others engaged 
in efforts to move towards a more value-
driven health care system—participated in 
the 2008 Summit on Healthcare Payment Re-
form convened by the Network for Regional 
Healthcare Improvement . Participants in the 
summit discussed these issues and challenges, 
•
•
•
•
•
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and they made a series of recommendations 
to help address them .
Payment Systems and  
Organizational Structures Needed  
to Improve Primary Care
There is growing agreement that there need to 
be significant improvements in the way America 
both delivers and pays for primary care ser-
vices . For example, many states, regions, payers 
and providers are trying to improve the quality 
of primary care delivery by implementing the 
principles of the “patient-centered medical 
home” that were developed by a number of 
physician organizations . The basic concept of 
a medical home is that each patient has an 
ongoing relationship with a personal physician 
and a team of other health care professionals 
who collectively take responsibility for providing 
or arranging for all of the patient’s health care 
needs in a coordinated way . Other concepts, 
such as the chronic care model, are also being 
pursued . However, most primary care provid-
ers cannot make the changes in care delivery 
envisioned in these models without improved 
payment systems to support them . Addition-
ally, payers want assurances that the provid-
ers will reduce costs and/or improve quality 
before changing payment systems . How should 
both payment systems and provider structures 
evolve to meet these goals?
Recommendation .: Payers should 
not require primary care providers to meet 
rigid certification or accreditation standards 
in order to participate in improved payment 
systems, but should instead encourage innova-
tions that improve outcomes and control or 
reduce costs .
Recommendation .: Payers should 
phase in changes to payment systems to sup-
port the changes in primary care needed to 
improve quality and cost outcomes, beginning 
with enhanced fees and moving toward more 
comprehensive payments .
Provider Organizational Structures 
Needed to Manage Bundled  
Payments and Warranties in  
Major Acute Episodes
A true episode-of-care payment system for 
major acute care involves paying a single 
price for all services delivered by all providers 
involved in a patient’s care . But combining the 
services of hospitals, physicians and post-acute 
care providers into a single payment—known 
as “bundling”—presumes the existence of an 
entity that can serve as the recipient of the 
single payment and divide it among the indi-
vidual providers in a manner acceptable to 
those providers . Episode-of-care payment also 
envisions the provision of warranties—com-
mitments by health care providers to address 
errors or complications without charging for 
additional services—but this increases the 
challenges associated with bundled payments 
because of the difficulties of apportioning 
responsibility for the errors or complications 
among the multiple providers involved . What 
kinds of organizational structures can support 
payment bundling, and how can both payment 
systems and health care organizations evolve 
to achieve these goals?
Recommendation .: Payers should 
make bundled payments to provider organiza-
tions and partnerships that demonstrate the ca-
pacity and expertise to manage the full episode 
of care and the associated payments .
Recommendation .: Payers, providers, 
regional collaboratives and other organizations 
should take steps to facilitate the transition to 
bundled payments, including public reporting 
about the total cost of care, providing technical 
assistance to providers, and making transitional 
changes to payment systems .
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Recommendation .: Restrictions on 
providers’ ability to divide bundled payments 
among themselves should provide an appro-
priate balance between protecting patients 
and encouraging innovation and should ensure 
a level playing field for negotiations among 
providers .
Encouraging Use of Higher- 
Value Providers and Services
In order to have a more value-driven health 
care system, payment systems need to assist 
and encourage patients to use higher-value pro-
viders and services . A provider delivers “higher 
value” if it delivers the same quality of services 
as another provider but at a lower cost or if it 
delivers higher-quality services at the same cost . 
When there are multiple providers that can 
deliver the care a patient needs or when there 
are different types of services available that 
vary in effectiveness or cost, how should pay-
ment systems encourage consumers to use the 
higher-value providers and services? 
Recommendation .: Consumers 
should have choices about which health care 
provider to use, but they should be required 
to pay significantly more if they choose lower-
value providers when higher-value providers 
are available .
Recommendation .: Consumers and 
providers should have valid and understandable 
information on the relative value of different 
options for diagnosing or treating a health con-
dition, and consumers should be required to 
pay more if they choose lower-value options .
Protecting Patients in  
New Payment Systems
Episode-of-care and condition-specific capita-
tion systems give health care providers greater 
responsibility for managing the overall cost of 
a patient’s care . However, in doing so they also 
may provide a greater financial incentive for the 
provider to inappropriately limit services—par-
ticularly those services whose preventive value 
will manifest many years in the future—or 
refuse to care for patients who appear likely to 
have poor outcomes within a severity-adjusted 
category . How should patients be protected 
under such payment systems?
Recommendation 4.: Health care pro-
viders should be required to deliver essential, 
evidence-based services to patients —unless 
the patients refuse—in order to receive pay-
ment and should be required to report publicly 
on the level and quality of services provided to 
patients, particularly to minority and disadvan-
taged populations .
Recommendation 4.: A combination of 
effective severity/risk adjustment mechanisms 
and outlier payments must be included in new 
payment systems to protect both patients and 
providers .
Recommendation 4.: Patients should 
receive financial incentives to use high-value 
preventive services and to adhere to effective 
care processes .
Piloting Payment Systems
Even where there is agreement on the gen-
eral structure of improved payment systems, 
there are many details to be worked out and 
there is always the risk of unintended and 
unanticipated consequences . Pilot projects 
provide the opportunity to test new pay-
ment systems and their components so that 
refinements can be made before widespread 
implementation . However, there are also sig-
nificant costs and challenges associated with 
organizing pilot projects . How should pilot 
projects be designed in order to most ef-
fectively advance the creation of value-driven 
payment systems?
R
ecom
m
endations of the 2008 N
R
H
I H
ealthcare Paym
ent R
eform
 Sum
m
it
4
F R O M  V O L U M E  TO  VA L U E
Transforming Health Care Payment and Delivery Systems to Improve Quality and Reduce Costs
Recommendation 5.: Pilot projects for 
new payment systems should be designed to 
gain experience with care changes that will both 
improve quality and reduce or control costs .
Recommendation 5.: Pilot projects 
should support care changes that can benefit 
large numbers of patients but should focus on 
specific patients and conditions with significant 
potential for improvements in value .
Recommendation 5.: Pilot projects 
should phase in provider participation, begin-
ning with the most interested and capable 
providers .
Recommendation 5.4: Pilot projects 
should be expected to provide aggregate cost 
savings within two to three years, but higher 
expenditures may be needed initially .
Recommendation 5.5: Participation by a 
critical mass of payers is essential to the success 
of pilot payment reform projects .
Encouraging Payers and Providers  
to Support New Payment Systems
Although there is growing agreement that 
fundamental reforms in payment systems are 
needed to solve the problems that exist in 
health care today, payers, providers, purchasers, 
and patients will all likely worry about the cost, 
effort, and potential negative consequences to 
them in transitioning to new payment systems 
and care delivery models . How can or should 
these concerns be mitigated? How can the 
inertia of existing systems be overcome? And if 
new payment systems achieve savings, who will 
gain and who will lose? 
Recommendation 6.: Purchasers of 
health care and health insurance must demand 
changes in payment systems that support high-
value health care .
Recommendation 6.: Hospitals and 
specialty providers should begin planning now 
to adapt to the changes resulting from value-
driven health care .
Recommendation 6.: Assistance should 
be provided to small physician practices to 
help them adapt to the changes resulting from 
value-driven health care .
Community-Wide Structures  
Needed to Support Payment Reform
Markets other than health care have a variety 
of structures to facilitate and regulate trans-
actions among market participants and to 
protect consumers, e .g ., consumer protection 
bureaus, financial rating agencies, etc. These 
structures and systems are independent of 
individual buyers and sellers but are designed 
to support them in their dealings in the 
marketplace. Similarly, many of the structures 
and activities needed to facilitate the transi-
tion to new health care payment systems are 
not specific to any one payer or provider and 
could be supported by regional, state, and 
national organizations other than payers and 
providers . A particular challenge in health care 
is finding ways to enable payers to align their 
payment systems without fear of violating 
antitrust laws . 
Recommendation 7.: Neutral public-pri-
vate organizations at the regional or state level 
should encourage and assist payers to align 
their payment structures .
Recommendation 7.: Systems for re-
porting on the quality and cost of health care 
providers and services should be established at 
the regional or state level in order to help pay-
ers and consumers identify higher-value provid-
ers and services, but the methodologies used 
should be consistent across the nation to the 
maximum extent possible .
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Recommendation 7.: Aggressive efforts 
are needed to educate consumers about the 
critical need for new payment systems and 
more value-driven care and to actively involve 
consumers in the process of designing and 
monitoring implementation of changes in pay-
ment and care .
Supporting Regional and State  
Payment Reform Efforts
The systems for delivering and paying for health 
care differ dramatically from region to region, 
so initiating payment reforms at the regional or 
state level is appropriate. What kinds of na-
tional support should be provided to facilitate 
the development, evaluation, and replication of 
regional payment reforms?
Recommendation 8.: The federal gov-
ernment should provide funding to support 
regionally defined pilot projects and should 
authorize participation by Medicare .
Recommendation 8.: The Network 
for Regional Healthcare Improvement should 
support regions in pursuing payment reform 
through information sharing and advocacy .
Moving From Concept to Reality
Major changes in health care payment systems 
are essential in order to achieve the kinds of 
improvements in health care quality and reduc-
tions in costs that the nation badly needs . These 
changes will require a significant investment of 
time and effort by all participants in the health 
care system, and these participants will face 
a number of significant challenges. However, 
as the recommendations above demonstrate, 
there are ways to overcome the challenges . 
Ultimately, the ability to make the changes in 
both payment systems and health care delivery 
that are envisioned here will depend on the 
support and engagement of all of the stake-
holders in the health care system—citizens, 
payers, providers, purchasers, regional coalitions, 
government officials, and others. The exten-
sive and enthusiastic participation of so many 
stakeholders in the NRHI summits, and their 
ability to reach consensus on the types of bold 
recommendations described in this report, 
should be a cause for optimism that the kind of 
support and interest needed for true reform 
of health care payment systems may now be in 
place .
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In other words, current health care payment 
systems encourage volume-driven health care 
rather than what is really needed—value-
driven health care .  
This problem has been recognized for some 
time . However, the primary response to date 
has been the creation of a variety of pay-for-
performance (P4P) programs, which add a 
new layer of rewards and incentives for quality 
improvement and cost containment on top 
of the existing payment systems . While well 
intended, there is growing agreement that most 
current pay-for-performance initiatives won’t 
by themselves solve the fundamental problems 
and disincentives that are built into the underly-
ing payment systems . Moreover, pay-for-perfor-
mance systems may unintentionally cause an 
overly narrow focus on specific processes and 
may cause providers to lose sight of the true 
goal: improving patient outcomes .
On March 29, 2007, the Network for Regional 
Healthcare Improvement (NRHI) convened a 
first-ever national Summit on Healthcare Pay-
I .  Introduct ion: Moving From Volume to Value
Figure 
Cost
Quality
Volume-Driven 
Health Care
Value-Driven 
Health Care
The rapid growth in health care costs is a major problem facing the U .S . economy . 
Although the majority of media and political 
attention has been focused on the growing 
number of people without health insur-
ance, one of the main reasons for the 
growth in the number of uninsured is 
the high cost of insurance, and efforts 
to expand insurance coverage are 
unlikely to be sustainable if health care 
cost inflation isn’t reduced. 
Despite the large amount of money 
spent on health care, studies have 
shown that the overall quality of health 
care services in the United States is 
mediocre at best . Even among people 
with health insurance, many do not 
receive appropriate preventive health 
care, many are hospitalized unneces-
sarily, and many of those hospitalized 
suffer from preventable infections or 
errors .
A major cause of both of these serious 
problems is the way health care services are 
paid for in most parts of the country . Under 
current payment systems, physicians, hos-
pitals and other health care providers gain 
increased revenues and profits by delivering 
more services to more people, which fuels the 
growth in health care costs . Yet research has 
shown that more services and higher spend-
ing do not improve outcomes; indeed, out-
comes are often worse in regions with higher 
levels of services and spending . In addition, 
these payment systems often financially penal-
ize health care providers for providing better 
quality services . In many cases, providers will 
lose revenues and experience lower profits if 
they keep people healthy, reduce errors and 
complications, and avoid unnecessary care . 
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ment Reform to accelerate thinking about how 
health care payment systems can be redesigned 
to reward rather than penalize improved quality 
and lower costs . The participants at the NRHI 
summit—health care providers and payers, re-
gional coalitions, researchers, and other thought 
leaders—agreed that fundamental changes 
to payment systems rather than just pay-for-
performance add-ons were essential, and they 
developed specific recommendations regarding 
the changes needed . 
Summit participants recommended the use 
of “episode-of-care payment” for major acute 
episodes such as a heart attack or a hip re-
placement . This involves paying a single price 
(often called a “case rate”) for all of the ser-
vices needed by a patient regardless of which 
providers are involved instead of multiple fees 
for each specific service provided. They also 
recommended the use of “risk-adjusted global 
fee” or “condition-specific capitation” systems 
to pay for the care of patients with chronic 
diseases . This involves paying a health care pro-
vider a single fee for all of the outpatient care 
needed by their patients rather than multiple 
fees for individual services, as well as reward-
ing the provider for keeping their patients 
healthy and reducing the use of unnecessary 
health care services . In addition, the participants 
recommended that payment reforms needed 
to be initiated at the regional level rather than 
waiting for federal action, and that pilot projects 
were needed in order to design the details 
of implementation and identify and resolve 
unintended consequences before broad-based 
implementation of payment reforms was at-
tempted . (A brief synopsis of the improved 
payment systems recommended at the 2007 
summit is included in Appendix A . For more 
detail on these new payment systems and 
where they have been used, see “Better Ways 
to Pay for Healthcare” by Harold D . Miller, a 
report prepared for the 2008 NRHI Summit on 
Healthcare Payment Reform .) 
Although these new payment systems hold 
significant promise for improving the quality 
Figure 
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and cost of health care, there are a number of 
important issues that need to be addressed and 
a variety of challenges that need to be over-
come in order to move them from concept to 
reality . Many of these issues and challenges stem 
from the number, diversity and complexity of 
organizations involved in health care . There are 
multiple payers, each with different payment 
methods and benefit structures, and a wide 
range of types of providers, all interacting in 
complex ways to deliver health care services to 
patients, as shown in Figure 2 . 
As depicted in Figure 2, there are a number of 
key questions that must be addressed in design-
ing and implementing new payment systems:
 Which health care providers, if any, are able 
and willing to accept new payment struc-
tures and deliver value-based care? 
 How should the use of high-value providers 
and services be encouraged? What protec-
tions are needed to ensure appropriate 
quality for patients? 
 How can payers and providers be encour-
aged to participate in new payment and 
delivery systems? How similar do different 
payers’ systems need to be?
 What kinds of pilot projects are needed to 
test new payment systems?
 What community-wide structures are 
needed to support payment reform? 
To address these questions, NRHI held a sec-
ond national Summit on Healthcare Payment 
Reform in Pittsburgh on July 31, 2008 . The goals 
of the summit were to develop more detailed 
recommendations on how to move from the 
current volume-driven health care system to a 
truly value-driven health care system . 
•
•
•
•
•
More than 100 individuals participated in the 
2008 NRHI Summit on Healthcare Payment 
Reform . The participants came from 21 states 
and Washington, D .C ., and included physicians; 
hospital administrators; health plan executives; 
academics; foundation leaders; regional coali-
tion directors; federal, state and local govern-
ment officials; executives of health care quality 
improvement organizations; and others engaged 
in efforts to move toward a more value-driven 
health care system . (A list of the participants is 
included in Appendix B .)
Prior to attending the summit, participants read 
a detailed Summit Framing Paper prepared by 
Harold D . Miller, President of Future Strategies, 
LLC and Strategic Initiatives Consultant for 
the Pittsburgh Regional Health Initiative, which 
outlined the issues and options to be addressed 
at the summit . (The paper is available online at 
www.nrhi.org/downloads/2008NRHIPayment 
ReformSummitFramingPaper.pdf .)
Opening presentations at the summit were giv-
en by three national leaders in new approaches 
to health care payment and delivery:
 Ann Robinow, President of Robinow 
Consulting, described the “Patient Choice” 
health care payment model as implemented 
in Minnesota and how it has encouraged 
increased value in health care delivery .
 Francois de Brantes, National Coordinator 
for PROMETHEUS Payment, described the 
PROMETHEUS payment system and how it 
is being implemented .
 David Share, Senior Associate Medical 
Director for Health Care Quality at Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, described the 
Physician Group Incentive Program and the 
Patient-Centered Medical Home initiative in 
Michigan .
•
•
•
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(Audio files and PowerPoint slides from the 
three presentations are available online at www.
nrhi.org/2008Summit.html .) 
Summit participants then divided into work 
groups to make recommendations for ad-
dressing the issues shown in Figure 2, using the 
options in the Summit Framing Paper as a start-
ing point. The work groups were facilitated by 
Sophia Chang, Director of the Better Chronic 
Disease Care Program at the California Health-
Care Foundation; Maulik Joshi, President and 
CEO of the Network for Regional Healthcare 
Improvement; David Lansky, President and CEO 
of the Pacific Business Group on Health; and 
Harold Miller. Following the work sessions, the 
participants convened in a plenary session to 
discuss and agree on overall recommendations 
from the summit .
The recommendations from the summit are 
described in the remainder of this report, which 
was prepared by Harold Miller, who also served 
as the overall summit coordinator .
Generous financial support for the 2008 
NRHI Summit on Healthcare Payment Reform 
was provided by the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation . In addition, the Pittsburgh Region-
al Health Initiative served as the host for the 
summit and provided additional financial and 
in-kind support.
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I 1 .   Organizat iona l  Structures Needed  
to Suppor t Fundamenta l  Payment Reforms
A primary goal of improved payment sys-tems is to enable and encourage health 
care providers to go beyond delivering nar-
rowly defined fee-based services to patients  
by taking on significantly greater responsibilities 
for managing the overall quality and cost of a 
patient’s care, i .e ., moving from volume-driven 
health care to value-driven health care . Although 
theoretically desirable, implementing these 
payment systems raises a fundamental question: 
Which health care providers, if any, are able and 
willing to accept such payments and the respon-
sibilities associated with them? If a large number 
of providers can and will accept and manage 
the payments effectively, then the new pay-
ment system can be successful . But if few or no 
providers can do so, then, as a practical matter, 
the payment system cannot be implemented or 
will likely not achieve the desired improvements 
in value . 
A. Payment Systems and  
Organizational Structures Needed  
to Improve Primary Care
These issues are central to current efforts to 
improve primary care delivery .  Efforts are 
underway all across the country to encour-
age the adoption and implementation of 
processes consistent with the principles of 
the “patient-centered medical home,” both 
broadly and for specific categories of patients. 
The basic concept of a medical home is that 
each patient has an ongoing relationship with 
a personal physician and a team of other 
health care professionals who collectively 
take responsibility for providing or arranging 
for all of the patient’s health care needs in a 
coordinated way . Other concepts, such as the 
Chronic Care Model, are also being pursued . 
There are multiple goals for doing this, includ-
ing improving patients’ health and reducing 
preventable hospital admissions . (For a more 
detailed discussion of the medical home and 
other initiatives to improve primary care, see 
the discussion and references in Section III-A 
of the Summit Framing Paper .)
However, these efforts present a “chicken and 
egg” problem . Most primary care providers 
cannot implement the care changes required 
by these models without improved payment 
systems to support them, but payers want 
assurances that providers will reduce costs or 
improve quality before changing payment sys-
tems . The participants at the 2008 NRHI Sum-
mit on Healthcare Payment Reform discussed 
and developed the following recommendations 
regarding these issues .
Recommendation .: Payers should 
not require primary care providers to meet 
rigid certification or accreditation standards 
in order to participate in improved payment 
systems, but should instead encourage innova-
tions that improve outcomes and control or 
reduce costs.
 Any organization that is focused on pri-
mary care and accepts accountability for 
patient outcomes and costs should be able 
to participate in payment systems de-
signed to support medical homes or other 
improvements in primary care delivery. 
 Payers should wait for additional evalua-
tions regarding which specific processes 
and structures produce better outcomes 
before establishing or utilizing strict stan-
dards for which organizations can serve as 
medical homes. 
a.
b.
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 Payers should encourage innovative ap-
proaches to cost-effective primary care 
delivery and minimize barriers to par-
ticipation in new payment systems, par-
ticularly for small physician practices and 
nonphysician-led providers.
The participants at the NRHI summit felt it was 
both impossible and inappropriate, at least at 
this point in time, to establish strict standards 
as to which health care providers could serve 
as patient-centered medical homes . Too little 
is known about which specific processes are 
essential to quality care and which are cost 
effective to justify expecting health care provid-
ers to meet detailed and potentially expensive 
requirements in order to participate in payment 
systems designed to support improved care . 
For example, while electronic health record 
(EHR) systems can be very helpful to physician 
practices in providing quality health care, merely 
having an EHR does not guarantee quality care . 
Additionally, many physician practices that do 
not have EHRs provide high-quality care, so it 
is probably inappropriate to require that provid-
ers have EHRs in order to serve as a medical 
home, at least at this point in time . 
Many payers are currently using or planning 
to use the patient-centered medical home 
standards developed by the National Com-
mittee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) (www.
ncqa.org/tabid/631/Default.aspx) to determine 
which physician practices should receive 
increased or modified payments designed to 
support improvements in primary care . The 
summit participants felt that while standards 
such as these could serve as helpful guidelines 
to providers in improving their care processes, 
it is impossible to say that a provider that 
meets the standards will deliver higher-value 
care than one that does not . Consequently, it 
was felt that while it was not inappropriate 
to have some pilot payment projects requir-
c. ing physician practices to meet the NCQA 
standards, it would be undesirable if all pilot 
projects had such a requirement, since it 
would preclude the ability to determine 
whether providers meeting lesser or different 
standards could deliver equal or better value .
A motivation for payers to establish minimum 
standards is that proponents of the medical 
home clearly expect that not only will pay-
ments be made for services that are not paid 
for or provided today (e .g ., case management 
by nonphysicians), but the total payment to a 
primary care provider for care of a patient will 
be higher than it is today . Payers, however, are 
understandably reluctant to pay more without 
assurances that outcomes will be better and 
that costs will be saved elsewhere (e .g ., through 
reductions in preventable hospitalizations) . 
Summit participants agreed that higher ex-
pectations should accompany higher payment 
levels, but the expectations should be focused 
on achieving better outcomes, both in terms 
of quality and cost, rather than on complying 
with process standards that may or may not 
improve outcomes . It was felt that health care 
providers should be permitted and encour-
aged to develop innovative processes for 
improving outcomes rather than be micro-
managed through detailed process standards 
by external organizations . Similarly, participants 
felt that there should be as few barriers as 
possible for organizations of different sizes and 
types to participate in medical home payment 
systems . In particular, small physician practices 
should be encouraged to participate, as should 
nonphysician providers (e .g ., nurse practi-
tioner-led providers) . Because physicians in 
many parts of the country practice in solo or 
very small group practices, not allowing these 
physician practices to participate would result 
in relatively few patients being able to benefit 
from the improvements in care . 
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(Additional information on the issues and options 
discussed in reaching this recommendation is 
available under Issue 1.1 in the Summit Framing 
Paper.)
Recommendation .: Payers should 
phase in changes to payment systems to sup-
port the changes in primary care needed to 
improve quality and cost outcomes, beginning 
with enhanced fees and moving toward more 
comprehensive payments.
 Ultimately, the current fee structure 
should be completely replaced, and prima-
ry care providers should receive a single, 
severity-adjusted comprehensive payment 
to cover all of the costs of a person’s 
outpatient care, with a portion of the 
payment based on outcomes and costs. In 
addition, consumers should receive incen-
tives for utilizing a primary care provider 
as a medical home.
 In the near term, relatively few primary 
care providers will likely be able to ef-
fectively manage such comprehensive 
payments. To enable providers to make the 
transition, health care payers should mod-
ify current payment systems to support 
new or modified primary care services 
such as improved care management, but 
only if providers accept greater responsi-
bility for maintaining or reducing patients’ 
total cost of care. Consumer incentives 
should be phased in when there is a suf-
ficient number of primary care providers 
available to support them.
 At a minimum, all payers should change 
their payment systems to use similar 
measures and consistent performance 
expectations for primary care providers, 
so that providers can improve their care 
processes for all of their patients.
a.
b.
c.
Consistent with the recommendations of the 
2007 NRHI Summit on Healthcare Payment 
Reform regarding payment systems for chronic 
disease care (see Appendix A), the participants 
in the 2008 summit felt that in the long run (i .e ., 
within five to 10 years), primary care provid-
ers should receive a single payment for all of a 
person’s outpatient care, completely replacing 
the current system of fees for individual services . 
The amount of the payment should be adjusted 
based on characteristics of the patient that affect 
the level of health care services needed, such as 
the number and types of chronic diseases they 
have and whether they have language barri-
ers or disabilities . The payment amount should 
be adequate to compensate the provider for 
delivering high-quality care, and the provider 
should have the flexibility to use the payment for 
whatever combination of services will achieve 
the best outcomes for the patient, rather than 
being limited to the specific types of services 
defined in fee-for-service billing codes.
Importantly, this comprehensive payment 
should also include rewards and/or penal-
ties based on the cost and quality outcomes 
achieved for the patients under the provider’s 
care . One of the goals of these rewards/penal-
ties should be to ensure that total expenditures 
by health care payers do not increase beyond 
levels that would have been expected other-
wise for the same number and types of patients, 
even though the payments to the primary care 
providers might well be higher . For example, a 
key outcome of improved primary care should 
be reductions in preventable hospitalizations, 
so one approach would be to make higher 
payments to primary care providers whose 
patients have low rates of preventable hospital-
izations than to providers with similar patient 
populations but higher rates of hospitalization .
However, the summit participants agreed that 
while some primary care providers might be 
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ready to accept such a new payment system 
today, others will not. For example, a significant 
amount of time and skill will be needed to re-
tool the operations of many physician practices 
to meet the goals of the medical home; design 
or select and implement new billing, cash flow 
management, and other systems; and recruit 
and integrate nonphysician staff such as nurse 
care managers into their care teams . Since 
current health care payment systems primar-
ily reward volume not quality or efficiency, it 
is likely that skills in designing and managing 
care processes to improve quality and control 
costs will be in short supply until the incentives 
change . Consequently, transitional improve-
ments to payment systems will be needed 
to support health care providers during their 
transition to a more value-driven structure—a 
“co-evolution” of payment and organizational 
capacity . 
There are several forms this transitional “en-
hanced fee-for-service system” might take. For 
example, new fees and billing codes could be 
created to pay for services and processes need-
ed to deliver medical home capabilities, such 
as nurse care managers and phone contacts 
with patients, which are not reimbursed under 
the current fee-for-service system . Alternatively, 
providers could be paid a single additional fee 
on top of existing fees to cover all of these 
additional new services and processes . In either 
case, providers should also receive bonuses or 
penalties based on things such as the number 
of preventable hospitalizations, emergency 
room visits and hospital readmissions in order 
to assure payers that total expenditures will 
remain budget neutral .
It is very difficult, if not impossible, for a health 
care provider to significantly change its process-
es of care for only a small subset of its patients . 
Similarly, it is highly problematic 
for a provider to manage care for 
some patients who are paid for 
under a fee-for-service system 
that rewards volume and at the 
same time manage care for other 
patients who are paid for under 
a value-driven payment system . 
Consequently, it is highly desirable, 
if not essential, for a majority of 
payers to make changes in pay-
ment systems that will support 
and reward improved care . Al-
though it would be ideal from the 
providers’ perspective if all payers 
used identical methods of mak-
ing payments, payers should, at a 
minimum, establish similar incen-
tives and use consistent outcome 
measures, since the challenges of 
complying with multiple rules and 
systems can significantly increase 
administrative costs for providers . 
Figure 
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(Additional information on the issues and options 
discussed in reaching this recommendation is 
available under Issues 1.2 and 6.2 in the Summit 
Framing Paper.)
b. Provider Organizational  
Structures Needed to Manage  
Bundled Payments and Warranties 
in Major Acute Episodes
The participants at the 2007 NRHI Summit on 
Healthcare Payment Reform recommended 
that for a patient experiencing a major acute 
episode, the payer should make a single case rate 
payment for all of the services delivered to the 
patient by all health care providers during that 
episode of care, rather than paying separate fees 
to individual providers for each separate service . 
(See Appendix A for a more detailed description 
of episode-of-care payment .)
A number of individual health care providers, 
such as hospitals and surgeons, 
are already paid by many pay-
ers on an episode or case-rate 
basis rather than a fee-for-ser-
vice basis . What does not rou-
tinely happen today is for the 
services of different providers 
to be “bundled” together into a 
single episode payment, even if 
all of those services are integral 
parts of a single patient’s total 
episode of care . For example, 
if a patient requires hospitaliza-
tion for surgery, the hospital 
and surgeons will be paid on 
an episode or case-rate basis 
but other physicians will be 
paid on a fee-for-service basis, 
and the hospital and each 
physician will be paid separately, 
not jointly . As a result, there is 
no financial incentive for all of 
the providers to coordinate 
their efforts on behalf of the patient, particu-
larly if some of the providers are still subject 
to the undesirable incentives and limitations of 
the fee-for-service system . Moreover, there are 
laws that prohibit the providers from making 
arrangements among themselves that could 
create better incentives .
A true episode-of-care payment system 
bundles all payments for all of the providers’ 
services into a single, comprehensive payment 
that covers all of the services involved in the 
patient’s complete episode of care . (See Sec-
tions II-J and III-B of the Summit Framing Paper 
for a more detailed explanation of episode 
payments and bundling .) However, this pre-
sumes the existence of an organizational entity 
that can (a) serve as the recipient of the single 
payment and (b) divide that payment among 
the individual providers in a manner acceptable 
to those providers . An integrated health care 
Figure 4
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delivery system, if it employs physicians and 
operates both hospitals and post-acute care 
services, might seem best positioned to accept 
such payments . But most patients are not cared 
for by integrated health care delivery systems . 
The participants at the 2008 NRHI Summit 
on Healthcare Payment Reform discussed and 
developed the following recommendations 
regarding the organizational structures and sup-
port systems needed to move toward bundled 
payments . 
Recommendation .: Payers should 
make bundled payments to provider organi-
zations and partnerships that demonstrate 
the capacity and expertise to manage the full 
episode of care and the associated payments.
 The criteria for providers’ participation 
in a bundled payment system should be 
whether they demonstrate the commit-
ment, relationships and administrative 
capacity to successfully manage such pay-
ments and deliver high-value care, not on 
any particular orga-
nizational structure 
per se. In particular, 
there needs to be 
significant buy-in and 
mutual trust from all 
participating provid-
ers, the capability to 
deliver services in 
the most cost-effec-
tive way and manage 
a patient’s care in 
a coordinated way, 
and an administra-
tive infrastructure 
to accept and divide 
payments among in-
dividual providers in 
an appropriate way.
a.
 Initially, integrated health care delivery 
systems may be more likely to meet the 
defined criteria, but nonintegrated provid-
ers should be encouraged to form innova-
tive collaborations that meet the minimum 
criteria for participation. Regional health 
care collaboratives could facilitate discus-
sions and agreements among nonintegrat-
ed providers.
 Different payers should bundle payments 
in as similar a fashion as possible in order 
to facilitate providers’ ability to manage 
care consistently for all patients. 
There is no type of organizational structure that 
automatically guarantees successful implemen-
tation of a bundled payment system, nor is it 
possible to say that any particular type of orga-
nizational structure cannot be successful under 
such a system . Even an individual physician in a 
solo practice could, if they wished, develop the 
capacity and expertise to manage a patient’s full 
episode of care and make payments to other 
providers involved in delivering that care .
b.
c.
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The summit participants felt that the empha-
sis should be on whether providers meet key 
criteria for success, not whether they have a 
particular size or organizational form . These 
criteria include the following:
 There should be significant buy-in and trust 
among all of the parties who would be in-
volved in the bundled payment system, par-
ticularly among all of the providers whose 
revenues would come from the bundled 
payment, as well as between the providers 
and the payer .
 The providers should have the capability of 
providing services in the most cost-effective 
way possible . For example, for many types 
of patients, providers with the capability of 
delivering at least some services in patients’ 
homes will likely be able to achieve lower 
costs and better outcomes than those de-
pendent on delivering care solely in institu-
tional settings .
 The providers should have systems and 
processes in place for coordinating their 
respective services to maximize the quality 
and efficiency of care for individual patients, 
since a key rationale for creating a bundled 
payment is to support more coordinated 
care .
 The providers should have an administra-
tive system for accepting and dividing the 
bundled payment among themselves in 
a way that rewards higher-quality, more 
efficient care and not inappropriate or inef-
ficient care (see Recommendation 2.3).
It is likely that integrated health care delivery 
systems will be better able to meet the criteria 
for accepting bundled payments in the short run 
than nonintegrated providers . However, since 
most patients are not cared for by integrated de-
•
•
•
•
livery systems, it will be important to encourage 
the development of innovative collaborations of 
independent providers that can also participate 
in bundled payment systems . While innovative 
arrangements should be encouraged, the mini-
mum criteria for participation should not be set 
too low; the success of the initial pilot projects 
will be critical in building support for continued 
implementation . Neutral organizations, such as 
regional health care collaboratives, may be helpful 
in facilitating discussions among nonintegrated 
providers in order to reach agreements on how 
to manage bundled payments in ways that are 
both fair to all providers and also improve out-
comes for patients .
As with other payment reforms, it is very 
difficult for health care providers to develop 
all of the processes needed to manage un-
der bundled payment structures and change 
their care delivery and coordination systems if 
bundled payments are only provided for a sub-
set of their patients, while other similar patients 
continue to be paid for under the fragmented 
fee-for-service system . Consequently, it is highly 
desirable, if not essential, for a majority of pay-
ers to use similar bundled payment approaches 
for the same types of patients and conditions . 
(Additional information on the issues and options 
discussed in reaching this recommendation is 
available under Issue 2.1 in the Summit Framing 
Paper.)
Recommendation .: Payers, providers, 
regional collaboratives and other organiza-
tions should take steps to facilitate the transi-
tion to bundled payments, including public re-
porting about the total cost of care, providing 
technical assistance to providers and making 
transitional changes to payment systems.
 Public reporting: Payers should compile in-
formation on the magnitude and variation 
a.
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of payments and distribute it to all of the 
various providers involved in an episode of 
care for patients with similar diagnoses.
 Technical assistance: Training and assistance 
should be made available to providers to 
help them improve the coordination of 
patient care and develop systems for man-
aging bundled payments.
 Transitional payment changes: Payers 
should pursue changes in payment systems 
that will provide a foundation for full bun-
dling, such as paying more physicians on 
a case rate basis (not just surgeons) and 
providing incentives for both hospitals and 
physicians to reduce readmission rates.
Although bundled payment is a desirable goal, 
it represents a dramatic change from current 
payment systems and raises a series of complex 
implementation issues . As a result, a series of 
actions should be taken to provide a stronger 
foundation for a true bundled payment system .
A logical first step is simply compiling and 
disseminating information about the number 
and types of providers who receive payments 
during individual episodes of care and the 
variation in the total amount of those payments 
for different patients with similar diagnoses . 
Because only payers generally have this type 
of information and different providers are paid 
through different systems, assembling all pay-
ments associated with a single patient episode 
can represent a significant challenge.
In addition, providers outside of integrated 
health care systems would likely benefit from 
technical assistance from a neutral party, such 
as a regional health care collaborative, in form-
ing organizational structures and establishing 
operating procedures that facilitate coordi-
nation of care delivery . These organizational 
b.
c.
structures could ultimately enable the provid-
ers to effectively allocate a bundled payment 
among themselves if and when such a pay-
ment is provided .
Rather than moving directly from the current 
fragmented payment structure to a bundled 
payment system in a single leap, it is probably 
preferable to evolve payment systems toward 
bundled payment in a series of discrete steps . 
The kinds of intermediate steps that would 
better position both providers and payers for 
full-scale bundling would include:
 Creating a case rate—a single fee for all 
services provided during the episode—for 
each provider in each phase of an episode of 
care, e .g ., paying each physician a single fee 
for a patient’s hospital stay, not just surgeons
 Including a warranty in each provider’s case 
rate, e .g ., including the hospital costs of 
any related hospital readmissions in the 
hospital’s DRG payment, including the physi-
cian fees for a hospital readmission in the 
physician’s case rate, etc .
 Permitting gain-sharing arrangements be-
tween hospitals and physicians (see Recom-
mendation 2 .3) 
 Bundling case rates for all providers in a 
particular phase of an episode of care, e .g ., 
paying a single fee to both the hospital and 
physicians managing the hospital stay
Once these steps are taken, the case rates for 
all phases of an episode could be combined, 
resulting in the desired totally bundled payment .
(Additional information on the issues and options 
discussed in reaching this recommendation is 
available under Issue 2.2 in the Summit Framing 
Paper.)
•
•
•
•
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Recommendation .: Restrictions on 
providers’ ability to divide bundled payments 
among themselves should provide an appro-
priate balance between protecting patients 
and encouraging innovation and should ensure 
a level playing field for negotiations among 
providers.
 At a minimum, the methodologies and 
mechanisms providers use for dividing bun-
dled payments should be reported publicly, 
and there should be systems for monitoring 
and reporting on the quality of care deliv-
ered to patients under bundled payments.
 Providers should be restricted in their 
ability to divide payments in ways that 
encourage overutilization of services, en-
courage under-provision of necessary care 
for patients or inappropriately disadvan-
tage small providers.
There is little practical difference between (a) 
a hospital and physicians jointly accepting a 
bundled payment and having arrangements for 
dividing it, and (b) a hospital and physicians ac-
cepting separate payments but having arrange-
ments for sharing portions of those payments 
with each other. The latter is known as “gain-
sharing,” and there are currently tight federal 
restrictions on such arrangements involving 
Medicare or Medicaid patients . In particular, the 
Civil Money Penalty provisions of the federal 
law governing Physician Incentive Plans prohibit 
a hospital from knowingly making a payment to 
a physician as an inducement to reduce or limit 
services to Medicare or Medicaid beneficiaries. 
In addition, the Stark Law prohibits a physician 
from making referrals for health services paid 
by Medicare or Medicaid to entities where the 
physician has a financial relationship.
There is little value in bundling payments if 
providers cannot divide them in ways that 
a.
b.
will reward improvements in the quality or 
cost of care. Although the Office of Inspec-
tor General (OIG) in the U .S . Department 
of Health and Human Services has approved 
waivers under the Civil Money Penalty law on 
a case-by-case basis for programs that meet 
a number of criteria, particularly those where 
the specific cost savings expected will have 
no adverse effect on patient care (e .g ., an 
agreement by all surgeons to use a particular 
medical device), this is a cumbersome and 
time-consuming process that does not sup-
port continuous quality improvement pro-
cesses, and the criteria are much too narrow 
to support significant transformation in health 
care quality and costs .
The participants at the NRHI Summit on 
Healthcare Payment Reform felt that a bet-
ter system for protecting patients would be 
to require full transparency by providers as to 
the mechanisms they use for dividing bundled 
payments and the quality of the care they 
provide to patients under the bundled pay-
ment arrangements . In addition, rather than 
prohibiting all gain-sharing arrangements except 
where exceptions are made, narrower prohibi-
tions should be established against the specific 
types of arrangements that would be viewed 
as problematic . In particular, providers could 
be prohibited from rewarding physicians based 
on the rate of admissions to the hospital or 
facility involved in the bundled payment . They 
could also be restricted in their ability to divide 
bundled payments in ways that result in unusu-
ally high or low payments to some providers or 
that result in some providers being paid below 
accepted estimates of minimum costs for qual-
ity care .
(Additional information on the issues and options 
discussed in reaching this recommendation is 
available under Issue 2.3 in the Summit Framing 
Paper.)
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P r o v i d e r s  a n d  S e r v i c e s
In order to have a more value-driven health care system, it is essential that payment 
systems assist and encourage patients to use 
higher-value providers and services . When it 
is clear that a patient needs a particular type 
of care and there are multiple providers who 
can provide that care, then to the extent that 
those providers differ in value, patients should 
be encouraged to receive their care from the 
higher-value providers rather than the lower-
value providers . In situations where there are 
choices as to which type of care is selected 
and where the alternatives differ in terms of 
their effectiveness and their cost, it would be 
desirable to encourage patients to use the 
higher-value alternatives as well as to select the 
highest-value providers that deliver the higher-
value alternatives . 
The participants at the NRHI Summit on 
Healthcare Payment Reform developed two 
recommendations for achieving these goals .
Recommendation .: Consumers 
should have choices about which health care 
provider to use, but they should be required 
to pay significantly more if they choose lower-
value providers when higher-value providers 
are available.
 Consumers should be given information 
about both the costs and quality of differ-
ent health care providers—both individual 
health care professionals and organiza-
tions of health care professionals—as well 
as training and assistance in using that 
information for decision making. Creative, 
proactive marketing efforts are needed to 
ensure consumers are aware of the infor-
mation and understand the importance of 
a.
using it. Health care providers should also 
be given information about the quality and 
cost of other providers so that their refer-
rals and recommendations can be based 
on value.
 Consumers should be required to pay all 
or a significant portion of the difference in 
cost between the providers if they choose 
a lower-value provider when a higher-value 
provider is available.
 In regions where there are multiple pro-
viders of a particular service, those provid-
ers should be grouped into a small number 
of tiers based on the relative value in both 
cost and quality of the care they provide 
in order to simplify consumer information 
and cost-sharing.
 Efforts should be made to encourage and 
assist providers to improve the value of 
the care they deliver so that consum-
ers have greater access to higher-value 
providers.
The first step in encouraging the use of higher-
value providers is collecting and publishing 
good information on providers’ quality and cost 
to enable their relative value to be compared . 
In addition to information that the U .S . Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services is now 
providing about the quality of various Medicare 
providers, a growing number of payers, regions 
and states are establishing quality reporting 
programs for physicians, hospitals and other 
health care providers . Continuation and expan-
sion of these efforts will provide a critical foun-
dation for payment systems based on value, and 
there is some evidence that reporting alone 
b.
c.
d.
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can encourage providers to improve the value 
of the care they deliver .
The participants at the NRHI Summit on 
Healthcare Payment Reform felt that public 
reporting, while essential, was insufficient to 
stimulate the significant transformation needed 
in health care and that financial incentives 
should be established for consumers to choose 
higher-value providers .
To some, it may seem counterintuitive to say 
that people should pay more for lower-value 
care and less for higher-value care, since it is 
generally believed that higher quality means 
higher cost . But many industries have demon-
strated that quality can be improved significant-
ly while maintaining or reducing costs, and there 
is growing consensus that this can also be true 
in health care . Indeed, as noted earlier, research 
has shown that higher costs in health care have 
not resulted in better outcomes . There is also 
growing consensus that one of the fundamen-
tal problems in the health care system is that 
consumers are too divorced from the costs of 
their choices .
The logic behind the recommendation be-
comes clearer if the concept of value is broken 
down into its constituent parts—cost and qual-
ity . If two providers have equivalent quality, but 
one has higher costs or charges more for its 
services, then the consumer should be respon-
sible for paying all or a significant fraction of the 
difference in the cost between the two, just as 
they would with any other product or ser-
vice that they purchase . If two providers have 
equivalent costs, but one has higher quality, then 
there would be no cost difference to consum-
ers, but they would have a natural incentive to 
choose the provider that delivers higher-quality 
service (assuming the consumer knows about 
the quality difference) . While the remaining 
scenario—one provider delivers higher quality 
than the other but charges a higher price—may 
seem more challenging, the only way to deter-
mine if the higher cost is justified by the higher 
quality is for the person making the choice to 
have some responsibility for the difference in 
cost as well as the opportunity to assess the 
difference in quality and the significance of that 
difference . (A service may be of “lower quality” 
but still adequate for the purpose of address-
ing the consumer’s health care need .) Although 
experience is limited, there is some evidence 
that health care providers can and will respond 
to such a system by finding ways to reduce 
their costs without compromising quality, just as 
businesses in other competitive industries do .
The traditional ways for consumers to share in 
the costs of health care services—copayments, 
co-insurance and deductibles with a maximum 
limit on the consumer’s out-of-pocket expen-
ditures—require the consumer to pay all or a 
portion of the “first dollar” that the provider 
charges . But for the purposes of implementing 
Recommendation 3 .1, a more effective ap-
proach may be to make the consumer explic-
itly responsible for all or a portion of the “last 
dollar,” i .e ., the difference between the prices 
of higher-cost and lower-cost providers . It is 
important to understand that the “prices” re-
ferred to here are not the “charges” that many 
health care providers currently establish for 
their services but rarely collect . Rather, the price 
is the amount that the provider will actually be 
paid for a service . For example, as shown in 
Figure 6, in addition to any normal co-payment 
or co-insurance amount that the consumer 
would pay (Consumer Share #1), they could 
be charged a second amount based on the dif-
ference in price between the provider they select 
and the lowest-price provider available to them 
(Consumer Share #2) . Although Figure 6 shows 
the consumer being responsible for the full 
amount of the difference in price between the 
selected provider and the highest-value pro-
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vider, the consumer could be made responsible 
for only a portion of the difference . 
In comparing providers on cost or price, 
adjustments will need to be made for the fact 
that some providers may have higher costs for 
socially desirable reasons that are unrelated to 
the costs of caring for individual patients . For 
example, academic medical centers and other 
teaching hospitals incur greater costs than 
community or nonteaching hospitals simply due 
to the additional personnel and time associ-
ated with teaching . Even if quality is the same, a 
teaching facility will be more expensive than a 
nonteaching facility . If patients are encouraged 
to use lower-cost facilities, it could jeopardize 
the ability of teaching hospitals to train new 
generations of physicians and other health care 
professionals . Medicare explicitly computes the 
portions of its hospital DRG payments that are 
attributable to medical education, but commer-
cial payers generally do not . Some states, such 
as Minnesota, have established a separate com-
munity-wide mechanism for paying for medical 
education, but other states have not . Similar 
issues arise with rural hospitals and inner-city 
providers, which must incur higher costs for 
serving low patient volumes, providing greater 
security and caring for more uninsured patients .
Another issue is that if there are a large num-
ber of providers to choose from, there may be 
relatively small differences in the cost and/or 
quality measures between some of them, and 
even those differences in the quality measures 
may be due to random statistical variations 
rather than genuine differences in the qual-
ity that an individual patient will experience, 
particularly on a prospective basis . To address 
this, the summit participants recommended that 
providers be grouped into a small number of 
tiers with other providers that have similar but 
not necessarily identical quality and/or cost . Al-
though a small number of tiers potentially allow 
variation in quality and/or cost inside of a tier 
with no formal recognition of the difference, 
the summit participants felt that the advantages 
of simplicity for consumers, at least during the 
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initial phases of implementation, outweighed 
any disadvantages in terms of achieving maxi-
mum value . 
Finally, the ability of consumers to choose 
higher-value providers is fundamentally con-
strained by the capacity and accessibility of 
those providers . Efforts need to be made to 
encourage lower-value providers to improve 
their quality and costs, and potentially encour-
age new higher-value providers to enter the 
market in order that all consumers have the 
ability to choose a high-value provider . Con-
sumers should only be expected to pay more 
for using low-value providers if one or more 
higher-value providers are available to them .
(Additional information on the issues and options 
discussed in reaching this recommendation is 
available under Issue 3.1 in the Summit Framing 
Paper.)
Recommendation .: Consumers and 
providers should have valid and understand-
able information on the relative value of 
different options for diagnosing or treating a 
health condition, and consumers should be 
required to pay more if they choose lower-
value options.
 Both consumers and the health care 
providers advising them should receive 
good information on the relative value of 
diagnosis and treatment options, and both 
should be encouraged to engage in shared 
decision making about those options. 
 Consumers should have access to in-
formed advice about options from a health 
care provider or other advisor without a 
financial interest in the choice the patient 
makes, and that advisor should be com-
pensated appropriately for providing the 
advice.
a.
b.
 In situations where diagnosis or treatment 
options are of similar quality or effective-
ness but differing cost, consumers should 
pay all or a large share of the difference in 
cost between the options. Where options 
differ in quality or effectiveness as well as 
cost, consumers should pay some portion 
of the difference in costs. 
For many conditions, there are choices as to 
which type of care can be provided, and the 
alternatives differ in terms of their effective-
ness and cost. The first step in ensuring that the 
highest-value options are chosen is to provide 
good information to both consumers and their 
physicians or other health care providers on the 
relative value of the different options . 
Although there is a growing amount of infor-
mation and evidence available about the rela-
tive value of different services and the relative 
quality of different providers, the current level 
of information and evidence falls well short of 
what is ideal, particularly for decision making 
by patients who have unique combinations of 
conditions or by those considering cutting-edge 
treatments and services . 
Even where information and evidence are avail-
able, because of the complexity of the tradeoffs 
between quality and cost, many patients will 
not be willing or able to make the choice about 
which treatment or service to use—or whether 
to have treatment at all—without significant 
education and assistance, including the input of 
a physician or other health care advisor with no 
financial interest in the decision. Studies have 
shown that when health care providers inform 
patients about the alternatives and tradeoffs 
in preference-sensitive care, the patients are 
more likely to use more cost-effective alterna-
tives. However, this requires extra time and skill 
on the part of the advisor to engage in this 
process, and this effort needs to be compen-
c.
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sated adequately . For example, elderly patients 
and patients with learning disabilities will often 
need special support in decision making, such as 
assistance from a social worker or other patient 
advocate .
As with the choice of providers in Recom-
mendation 3.1, consumers should have financial 
incentives to choose higher-value treatment 
options . Although there is a natural incentive 
for them to choose options where effective-
ness has been demonstrated to be greater, 
there also needs to be an incentive to select 
lower-cost options where effectiveness is similar, 
and to more explicitly consider the tradeoffs 
between cost and effectiveness when options 
differ on both dimensions .
(Additional information on the issues and options 
discussed in reaching this recommendation is 
available under Issue 3.2 in the Summit Framing 
Paper.)
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I V.   P r o t e c t i n g  P a t i e n t s  
i n  N e w  P a y m e n t  S y s t e m s
In theory, a payment system that gives a pro-vider more responsibility for managing the 
overall costs of care can also give that provider 
a greater financial incentive to inappropriately 
skimp on services—particularly those whose 
preventive value will manifest many years in the 
future—or to refuse to care for patients who 
appear likely to have poor outcomes, within 
a severity-adjusted payment category . How-
ever, the proliferation of pay-for-performance 
systems demonstrates that even fee-for-service 
payment has not protected patients against this 
problem. The incentive to skimp on services 
relates more to the adequacy of the payment 
amount, the provider’s efficiency in delivering 
services and the provider’s systems for ensuring 
that appropriate processes have been followed 
than on the structure of the payment system 
per se . Moreover, a well-designed episode-of-
care payment or global fee system also creates 
greater disincentives for providers to skimp on 
some kinds of care that exist today, since a pro-
vider that fails to provide high-quality services 
will be responsible for addressing some of the 
undesirable outcomes that result .
Nonetheless, as new payment models are being 
developed, it is appropriate to explicitly design 
mechanisms for ensuring that patients receive 
quality services and to protect them against be-
ing denied services inappropriately .
Recommendation 4.: Health care pro-
viders should be required to deliver essential, 
evidence-based services to willing patients in 
order to receive payment—unless the patient 
refuses—and should be required to report 
publicly on the level and quality of services 
provided to patients, particularly to minority 
and disadvantaged populations.
 Where clinical practice guidelines exist 
that clearly indicate a certain treatment or 
process is essential for delivery of high-
value care, health care providers should 
be expected to deliver that treatment or 
process in order to receive payment for 
care of the patient, unless there is clear 
documentation that the treatment or pro-
cess is contraindicated for the patient, the 
patient is participating in a formal clinical 
trial of alternative treatments, or the pa-
tient has refused to accept the treatment 
or process.
 National, state and regional quality mea-
surement systems should collect and pub-
licly report data on the level and quality 
of services individual providers deliver to 
their patients, with particular emphasis on 
underuse of evidence-based care process-
es and on the care of minority and disad-
vantaged populations. Both consumers and 
providers should be involved in defining 
the quality measures to be used, and pro-
viders should have adequate opportunities 
to ensure that the data are accurate.
It would be ideal if there were evidence-based 
clinical practice guidelines that could be used to 
determine whether all patients are receiving ex-
actly the care they need . However, such guide-
lines do not exist for the majority of conditions . 
Even where guidelines do exist, the level of 
evidence is sometimes relatively weak, making 
the guideline exactly that—a guideline—rather 
than an enforceable standard of care . 
Consequently, a combination of approaches 
is needed . In those cases where there is clear 
evidence that a treatment or process should be 
a.
b.
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used as part of appropriate care for a patient’s 
condition, a provider should not be paid for any 
of the care provided to the patient if that treat-
ment or process is not delivered as part of the 
care, except where it is clearly contraindicated, 
where the patient is participating in a clinical 
trial explicitly to test new processes, or where 
the patient explicitly refuses to accept the 
service or refuses to adhere to the elements 
of the care. In other words, providers that take 
responsibility for the care of a patient should be 
viewed as having accepted an obligation to de-
liver or arrange for all of the essential services 
the patient should receive, and failure to do so 
would be, in effect, a breach of contract . In the 
remaining cases, where no such evidence-based 
guideline exists or where the evidence is not 
strong enough to require delivery of specific 
processes, quality measurement and reporting 
systems should be used to determine whether 
some providers are delivering fewer or lower-
quality services, either in general or to sub-
groups of patients . 
As discussed in more detail in Recommenda-
tion 7 .2, the reports on the quality of providers 
and services should be produced not by pro-
viders themselves, but by regional or state or-
ganizations with the expertise to do so, ideally 
using methodologies that are consistent across 
the nation . Providers should have the oppor-
tunity to help define the quality measures, and 
they should also have adequate opportunity 
to review reports about their quality to ensure 
the reports are accurate before they are issued 
publicly . In addition, as discussed in more detail 
in Recommendation 7 .3, consumers need to be 
engaged in defining the quality measures, since 
a principal purpose of reporting the measures 
is to help consumers choose higher-value 
providers .
(Additional information on the issues and options 
discussed in reaching this recommendation is 
available under Issue 4.1 in the Summit Framing 
Paper .)
Recommendation 4.:  A combination of 
effective severity/risk adjustment mechanisms 
and outlier payments must be included in new 
payment systems to protect both patients and 
providers.
 Development and continued refinement 
of severity/risk adjustment mechanisms 
for use in payment systems should be a 
national priority.
 Outlier payments, reinsurance, etc. should 
be used in new payment systems as a fail-
safe protection and a feedback mechanism 
while severity/risk adjustment systems are 
being improved.
New payment models such as bundled pay-
ments, global fees, episode-of-care payments 
and condition-specific capitation are designed 
to remove the incentives providers currently 
have to deliver unnecessary services and re-
place them with incentives for keeping patients 
healthy . Although these systems substitute some 
form of single payment for what is paid for 
today through multiple payments, there is no 
expectation that this single payment should be 
the same amount for all patients, as has been 
the case under many traditional capitation 
systems . The amount of the payment should be 
higher for patients who have more diseases or 
conditions needing treatment and for patients 
who are at higher risk of developing such 
diseases or conditions in order to appropriately 
compensate health care providers for the ad-
ditional treatment and preventive services they 
will need to deliver to those patients .
This means that payment systems will need 
to have an effective severity/risk adjustment 
system to determine which patients have 
a.
b.
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more severe conditions or are at greater risk 
of developing conditions . Although a variety 
of such severity/risk adjustment systems exist 
today, most have been developed for research 
or quality reporting purposes, so they will likely 
need to be adapted for use in payment systems . 
Since effective severity/risk adjustment systems 
are critical to effective payment systems, the 
research needed to develop, evaluate, and con-
tinuously improve them should be a national 
priority . 
However, no matter how good a severity/risk 
adjustment system is, it will be impossible for 
it to accurately identify all patients with unique 
needs or predict the appropriate cost of caring 
for them . Consequently, a system of outlier 
payments or stop-loss arrangements will be 
needed to assure providers that they will not 
be financially penalized for caring for these pa-
tients . In other words, if the number of services 
needed to properly care for a particular patient 
significantly exceeds what reasonably can be 
covered by the payment amount for that pa-
tient (i .e ., the patient is an outlier compared to 
other patients with similar characteristics), the 
providers would receive an additional payment 
in order to reduce or eliminate the financial 
loss from delivering those additional services . 
These outlier/stop-loss payments could be 
made by the payer to those providers when 
such cases arise, or the providers could arrange 
for a reinsurance contract or establish a group 
self-insurance program to cover the outlier 
costs . In either case, providers would need to 
clearly document that the cases were truly out-
liers in terms of need or complexity, not simply 
situations where the provider’s own inefficiency 
led to the use of unnecessarily large numbers 
of services .
 (Additional information on the issues and op-
tions discussed in reaching this recommendation is 
available under Issue 4.2 in the Summit Framing 
Paper.)
Recommendation 4.: Patients should 
receive financial incentives to use high-value 
preventive services and to adhere to effective 
care processes.
Since patients who fail to adhere to appropri-
ate care may require more care and more 
expensive care than otherwise necessary, and 
to the extent that a provider is responsible 
for the costs of that care and can identify 
which patients are going to be least compliant, 
the provider will have a financial incentive to 
drop or avoid those patients . Consequently, 
in addition to discouraging providers from 
dropping or underserving patients, it is desir-
able to provide incentives to patients to take 
actions that can support improved quality and 
reduced cost .
(Additional information on the issues and options 
discussed in reaching this recommendation is 
available under Issues 4.2 and 4.3 in the Summit 
Framing Paper.)
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V. P i l o t i n g  N e w  P a y m e n t  S y s t e m s
There are many practical issues to be resolved in getting new payment systems 
from the design stage into actual operations . 
In some cases, there may simply be insufficient 
knowledge or experience as to how providers 
or patients will respond under different options 
in order to comfortably make a decision about 
which options should be used until they are 
tested. As with any kind of change, there will 
also likely be some unintended consequences 
and unexpected difficulties that will need to be 
identified and rectified before broader imple-
mentation is warranted . 
Because of this, the overwhelming majority 
of the participants at the 2007 NRHI summit 
agreed that demonstrations and pilot projects 
at the regional level would be needed before 
new payment systems could be implemented 
on a widespread basis . In this context, “regional” 
was viewed as the area served by a regional 
health care improvement collaborative . Where 
such a collaborative does not exist, the region 
would be the local health care market, i.e., the 
geographic area in which most patients use a 
common group of tertiary and quaternary care 
providers, a common group of health insur-
ance plans, or both, rather than an area defined 
solely by political boundaries .
However, there are many different issues and 
options that pilot projects could test, and so the 
participants at the 2008 NRHI summit devel-
oped the following recommendations on the 
types of pilot projects that should be priorities 
for regions to pursue .
Recommendation 5.: Pilot projects for 
new payment systems should be designed to 
gain experience with care changes that will 
both improve quality and reduce or control 
costs.
As noted in the Introduction, the nation is fac-
ing serious problems with both the cost and 
quality of health care, and the flaws in current 
payment systems are believed to be a major 
cause of each of these problems . In light of 
the widespread concerns about cost, there 
is unlikely to be support for pilot projects 
that would increase costs, even if they would 
improve quality . Because of the concerns about 
quality, there will likely be resistance to pilot 
projects that would reduce costs at the ex-
pense of quality . Consequently, payment reform 
pilot projects need to pursue both quality 
improvement and cost reduction as joint goals .
In addition, a third goal for pilot projects is to 
gain experience with the changes in care deliv-
ery that are expected to improve quality and 
reduce costs . Payment changes are not an end 
in themselves, but merely a means to support 
and encourage higher-value care . Ideally, pay-
ment reform pilots will have the flexibility to 
continuously adapt both the payment changes 
and the care changes based on the experience 
gained during the implementation process .
(Additional information on the issues and options 
discussed in reaching this recommendation is 
available under Issue 5.1 in the Summit Framing 
Paper.)
Recommendation 5.: Pilot projects 
should support care changes that can benefit 
large numbers of patients but should focus on 
specific patients and conditions with signifi-
cant potential for improvements in value.
Although there are situations involving small 
numbers of patients where current payment 
systems may preclude or discourage higher-val-
ue care, addressing these issues in pilot projects 
will likely have small financial benefits relative to 
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the costs and challenges of implementation, and 
the lessons learned may have limited relevance 
to other patients and conditions . This, in turn, 
will make it more difficult to attract the support 
of purchasers and payers, which will be more 
interested in changes with broader applicabil-
ity . Consequently, the participants at the NRHI 
Summit on Healthcare Payment Reform felt 
that priority should be given to pilot projects 
that support care changes applicable to large 
numbers of consumers or to patients who use 
large amounts of health care resources . “Large” 
would likely mean large enough that the po-
tential savings in the pilot project outweigh the 
administrative costs of setting up the pilot and 
evaluating its results, thereby making it worth-
while to pursue .
At the same time, the return on investment 
from broadly applicable care changes will likely 
vary significantly among different types of 
patients. Since it is unlikely that providers will be 
able to uniformly improve care for all patients 
at once, it is possible that providers could unin-
tentionally start with those patients where the 
care improvements will have lower potential for 
generating the cost savings needed to offset any 
increases in payment. This, in turn, could make 
the impact of the pilot project appear lower 
than its true potential . Consequently, consistent 
with Recommendation 5 .1, it is desirable to 
focus the payment and care changes on subsets 
of patients where the largest return is likely.
For example, the types of medical home ser-
vices contemplated in Section II-A would be 
of benefit to patients of all types, from those 
who are healthy to those who already have 
multiple chronic diseases . However, research 
suggests that there is a much greater oppor-
tunity to reduce costs more quickly by initially 
focusing those service improvements on pa-
tients who have chronic diseases, particularly 
patients who are being discharged from the 
hospital . The implication of Recommendation 
5 .2 for payment reform pilots designed to sup-
port medical homes is that they should focus 
on these latter subgroups, thereby increasing 
the opportunity to both improve quality and 
reduce costs .
(Additional information on the issues and options 
discussed in reaching this recommendation is 
available under Issue 5.2 in the Summit Framing 
Paper.)
Recommendation 5.: Pilot projects 
should phase in provider participation, begin-
ning with the most interested and capable 
providers.
Paying some providers under a new payment 
system but not others may create competitive 
advantages or disadvantages for each group . 
However, in a region with a large number of 
providers, particularly small physician prac-
tices, the sheer volume of effort involved in 
implementing changes for all providers could 
overwhelm a pilot project . Consequently, as a 
practical matter, a pilot project may need to 
start with a subset of providers and phase in 
others over a period of time .
A phase-in approach also allows problems and 
unintended consequences to be identified early 
and corrected before full-scale implementation . 
Because of this, it makes sense to begin with 
the subset of providers who are most inter-
ested, able and willing to participate in the most 
experimental stage of the pilot project .
(Additional information on the issues and options 
discussed in reaching this recommendation is 
available under Issue 5.3 in the Summit Framing 
Paper.)
Recommendation 5.4: Pilot projects 
should be expected to provide aggregate cost 
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savings within two to three years, but higher 
expenditures may be needed initially.
 A business case demonstrating that the 
pilot project is likely to maintain or reduce 
aggregate spending should be developed 
to justify payer participation.
 In most cases, care improvements cannot 
produce savings instantaneously. Con-
sequently, purchasers and payers will 
need to recognize that higher expendi-
tures may be needed initially to support 
upfront investments in order to achieve 
savings after implementation begins. In 
addition, for some types of pilot projects, 
health plans, purchasers and providers 
may need to commit to multiyear sup-
port and participation in order to maxi-
mize the continuity of patient-provider 
relationships.
 Achieving aggregate cost savings will mean 
that in order for some providers (e.g., 
primary care providers) to experience 
increases in revenues, others (e.g., hospi-
tals) will need to experience decreases in 
revenues.
As noted earlier, in an environment of intense 
concern about the high and growing cost of 
health care, there will likely be resistance, if not 
opposition, to implementing payment system 
changes on a pilot basis if they will increase 
costs . However, there are many reasons why 
new payment systems will require increased 
costs in the short run, even if they promote 
savings in the long run . For example, new bill-
ing and payment software systems need to be 
put in place by providers and payers, often at 
considerable expense, and new infrastructure 
and personnel will need to be put in place by 
primary care providers to implement the medi-
cal home model .
a.
b.
c.
Because of this, the participants at the NRHI 
Summit on Healthcare Payment Reform felt that 
it was unrealistic to expect that pilot payment 
reform projects could be cost neutral during the 
initial year or so of operation . Therefore, purchas-
ers and payers need to be willing to make higher 
payments initially to cover the transition and 
infrastructure costs associated with changes to 
both payment systems and care delivery . Howev-
er, it is also unreasonable to expect purchasers or 
payers to support these increased costs without 
a clear business case demonstrating that savings 
will be achieved within two to three years . This 
will likely preclude considering some prevention 
programs as part of initial pilot projects, simply 
because even if they succeed, the savings they will 
generate will be much farther in the future .
It is important to recognize that while overall 
spending should be reduced within this time 
frame, this does not mean that each provider’s 
revenue will be reduced . New payment systems 
are expected to result in a shift in spending 
from acute care to prevention, from hospitals 
to primary care, etc .
(Additional information on the issues and options 
discussed in reaching this recommendation is 
available under Issue 5.4 in the Summit Framing 
Paper.)
Recommendation 5.5: Participation by a 
critical mass of payers is essential to the suc-
cess of pilot payment reform projects.
 Ideally, all payers would participate in the 
payment changes in the pilot project, so 
that providers can make changes in care 
for all of their patients, regardless of payer, 
and receive the appropriate compensation 
and incentives for doing so.
 At a minimum, participation is needed 
from a group of payers that have sufficient 
a.
b.
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volume to significantly change the rev-
enues and profitability of the providers. 
The specific number and type of payers 
will depend on the region and the types of 
patients involved in the pilot project.
It is difficult for a provider to change the way 
it delivers patient care, particularly when new 
staff or infrastructure are required, if only a 
portion of the provider’s patients are paid for 
under a new payment system . For example, a 
key element of the medical home and chronic 
care models for patients with chronic dis-
eases is to have a nonphysician care manager 
provide patient education and self-manage-
ment support . A physician practice may have 
enough patients who can benefit from care 
management to justify hiring a full-time care 
manager, but if only a subset of those patients 
have coverage from payers who will reimburse 
for or otherwise support the cost of the care 
manager, the physician practice may lose money 
by hiring such an individual . Even if the practice 
had enough patients from participating payers 
to justify hiring a care manager solely for those 
patients, treating comparable patients differently 
based on payment also raises ethical and legal 
issues .
Although health care providers should be 
“payer neutral” in the way they care for pa-
tients, they can suffer financially from that ap-
proach if there are significant differences in the 
way different payers reimburse them for care . 
Consequently, to the maximum extent possible, 
a change in payment structure for a particular 
type of patient or condition should be adopted 
by all payers in a regional market.
The extent to which all-payer participation is 
feasible or desirable in a particular geographic 
area depends heavily on the number and size of 
payers and purchasers in that area . For ex-
ample, it may be harder for national payers—ei-
ther national health insurance companies or 
large, multistate self-insured companies—to 
make payment changes in a single market than 
for payers operating primarily in that area to 
do so . From a provider’s perspective, it will be 
better to have one large payer change its pay-
ment system than to have several very small 
payers do so if more patients will be affected . 
Also, if getting all payers to participate requires 
compromising excessively on the changes in the 
payment system, it may be better to move for-
ward on a better payment system with fewer 
payers rather than have more payers but fail 
to test the kinds of payment changes that are 
really needed . 
In many areas and for many types of medical 
conditions, Medicare and/or Medicaid are the 
largest individual payers, so it may be difficult 
to get a critical mass of payers in some pilot 
projects without the participation of Medicare, 
Medicaid or both . Fortunately, it is not unusual 
for state Medicaid agencies, particularly in 
large, diverse states, to have different payment 
structures in different parts of the state . The 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) has pioneered a number of different 
payment structures through demonstration 
projects in specific communities around the 
country . Consequently, it is at least feasible to 
contemplate creating payment reform pilots 
that would include all payers, including Medic-
aid and Medicare .
 (Additional information on the issues and op-
tions discussed in reaching this recommendation is 
available under Issues 6.1 and 6.2 in the Summit 
Framing Paper.)
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V I .   E n c o u r a g i n g  P a y e r s  a n d  P r o v i d e r s  
t o  S u p p o r t  N e w  P a y m e n t  S y s t e m s
Although there is growing agreement that fundamental reforms in payment sys-
tems are needed to solve the problems that 
exist in health care today, payers, providers, 
purchasers and patients will all likely worry 
about the cost, effort and potential negative 
consequences to them in transitioning to new 
payment systems and care delivery models . 
This may make some of them reluctant to 
participate and, in some cases, may cause 
them to actively oppose the changes . The par-
ticipants at the NRHI Summit on Healthcare 
Payment Reform discussed how these chal-
lenges could be overcome and developed the 
following recommendations .
Recommendation 6.: Purchasers of 
health care and health insurance must demand 
changes in payment systems that support 
high-value health care.
 Purchasers (e.g., businesses, individu-
als and governmental agencies that buy 
health insurance or directly pay for 
health services) should give preference 
to payers (health plans) that implement 
new payment systems that support high-
value health care.
 Purchasers should demand that payers 
use payment systems that provide similar 
incentives and use similar definitions in 
order to simplify provider participation. 
 Purchasers need to work together to 
create a critical mass of covered lives to 
participate in new payment systems to 
make it as cost-effective as possible for 
health plans and third-party administrators 
to implement payment changes.
a.
b.
c.
A considerable infrastructure is needed to 
support any type of payment system, including 
establishing definitions of patients/conditions to 
be paid for ; methods for providers to submit 
claims and be paid; systems for measuring 
quality; and rules and processes for resolving 
ambiguities, disputes, and errors . Even with a 
detailed conceptual design for how a payment 
system should work, extensive effort is needed 
to resolve all of the details, program and test 
new computer systems, print manuals and 
forms, train staff, educate providers and patients, 
and many other steps. This work is expensive, 
particularly since the development work must 
be done in parallel with continued operation of 
the current payment system . Moreover, not just 
the design but even the operations of the new 
payment system may also need to proceed in 
parallel with the current payment system, since 
not all patients or providers may be partici-
pating in the new system, at least in the short 
run. Payers may feel that the benefits of new 
payment systems will accrue to purchasers and 
patients, making it difficult to create an internal 
business case supporting the changes . Payers 
may be particularly reluctant to participate in 
pilot projects, since they may need to incur all 
or most of the same costs that would be as-
sociated with full-scale implementation, yet the 
returns will be more limited and there is the 
chance that the pilot will end with a decision 
not to proceed to full implementation .
In the end, it is the ultimate purchasers of 
health care—the organizations and individuals 
who purchase health insurance or directly con-
tract for care—and the consumers they repre-
sent who will benefit from the cost and quality 
improvements expected from health care 
payment changes, not health insurance plans . 
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Consequently, the pressure to change payment 
systems must come from those purchasers . 
They need to clearly indicate that they want 
their insurance plans or third-party administra-
tors (TPAs) to use better payment systems and 
to participate in pilot projects, and, if necessary, 
they need to change plans or TPAs in order to 
use those who do . 
In addition, purchasers have to demand not 
just that their plans and TPAs use better 
payment systems, but that those payment 
systems are fundamentally the same from a 
provider’s perspective as the new payment 
systems used by other plans and TPAs in order 
to achieve the alignment of incentives called 
for in Recommendations 1 .2, 2 .1 and 5 .5 . This 
requires a coordinated effort on the part of 
purchasers as well as on the part of the plans 
and TPAs . Moreover, since any individual health 
plan or TPA will have multiple purchasers as 
customers, it will be helpful if as many of those 
customers as possible are calling for the same 
kinds of payment changes. It is much more 
cost effective for a plan or TPA to implement 
a change in a payment system for a large 
number of consumers . Coordinated efforts 
to change the structure of payment systems 
do not imply setting prices for services in a 
coordinated way, i.e., price-fixing, but clear 
guidelines from antitrust enforcement agencies 
may be needed to overcome fears of purchas-
ers and health plans that they will be subject 
to penalties for pursuing such efforts .
(Additional information on the issues and options 
discussed in reaching this recommendation is 
available under Issue 7.1 in the Summit Framing 
Paper.)
Recommendation 6.: Hospitals and 
specialty providers should begin planning now 
to adapt to the changes resulting from value-
driven health care.
 Citizens, community leaders and health 
care providers should be educated about 
the likelihood that revenues for hospitals 
and specialty providers will decrease or 
grow more slowly in the future, depend-
ing on the region, and about the impor-
tance of constructively adapting to those 
changes. 
 Technical assistance should be made avail-
able to providers to help them eliminate 
waste and increase efficiency, and payers 
should modify or eliminate unnecessary 
administrative requirements on providers.
 Hospitals and specialists should proactively 
pursue opportunities to support primary 
care and preventive care and to deliver 
higher-value services.
 Payers should work collaboratively with 
providers to develop a plan for transition-
ing to new payment and care delivery 
structures, but providers should under-
stand that the goal of purchasers and 
payers is to increase value, not to protect 
providers’ revenues or profit margins.
A key goal of new payment systems is to slow 
the growth in health care costs and ideally to 
achieve net reductions in health care spending 
on a per capita basis . Although cost reduction is 
often discussed in abstract terms, as a practical 
matter, lower health care costs mean lower rev-
enues for at least some health care providers . 
Moreover, as noted under Recommendation 
5 .4, reductions or slowdowns in spending will 
not occur uniformly across all providers; some 
providers may gain revenues, while others will 
lose . In particular, there are widespread ex-
pectations that primary care physicians should 
receive more revenues under payment changes . 
The providers most likely to lose revenues are 
hospitals, particularly given the increasing focus 
a.
b.
c.
d.
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on payment changes designed to reduce or 
eliminate payments for preventable adverse 
events and readmissions and to reduce ad-
missions for ambulatory sensitive conditions . 
Reductions in hospitalizations may also result in 
reduced revenues for some specialty physicians .
The participants at the NRHI Summit on 
Healthcare Payment Reform felt that it was im-
portant to educate citizens, community leaders 
and health care providers about the necessity 
for these kinds of changes to occur and to 
encourage health care providers to begin plan-
ning now for ways to constructively adapt to 
the changes rather than oppose or attempt to 
undermine them .
Although reductions in revenues for some pro-
viders may be inevitable, this need not translate 
directly into reductions in their profits or operat-
ing margins. If a hospital can find ways to deliver 
care more efficiently or reduce its costs, it may 
be able to offset some or all of the reduction in 
revenues . For example, a number of initiatives 
based on the Toyota Production System and 
“Lean” principles (e .g ., the Pittsburgh Regional 
Health Initiative’s Perfecting Patient CareSM 
techniques and in-house projects conducted by 
hospitals such as Virginia Mason in Seattle and 
ThedaCare in Wisconsin) have shown significant 
results in reducing costs as well as improving 
quality . Helping providers obtain technical assis-
tance to restructure their operations and reduce 
their costs could facilitate the transition process 
to new payment systems, as well as reduce the 
problems of personnel shortages that are facing 
many health care providers .
While reducing operating costs to match 
reduced revenues will be necessary in order 
for providers to continue with current service 
models, providers should also be thinking about 
ways to more fundamentally restructure their 
operations to support a value-driven health 
care system . For example, hospitals and special-
ists could pursue opportunities to deliver or 
support primary care and preventive care, and 
they should be rewarded for doing so by a pay-
ment system that emphasizes primary/preven-
tive care rather than acute care .
Providers’ ability to plan for and implement 
changes would be facilitated if it could be 
done in a collaborative fashion with payers . For 
example, there may be ways that the timing or 
details of payment systems could be modified 
to reduce problems for providers during the 
transition process . However, these collabora-
tions should be designed only to facilitate the 
transition process, not to compromise on the 
fundamental goals of payment reform in order 
to protect providers’ revenues .
(Additional information on the issues and options 
discussed in reaching this recommendation is avail-
able under Issue 7.2 in the Summit Framing Paper.)
Recommendation 6.: Assistance should 
be provided to small physician practices to 
help them adapt to the changes resulting from 
value-driven health care.
 Technical assistance should be provided to 
help small physician practices manage care 
and finances under new payment models.
 Small physician practices should be en-
couraged and assisted to join together in 
organizational structures that can facilitate 
quality improvement, share resources, and/
or accept accountability for overall patient 
outcomes and costs.
 Financial assistance should be provided 
to small physician practices to help them 
cover the costs of installing new infra-
structure and transitioning to new care 
models.
a.
b.
c.
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Although many people hope or expect that 
new payment models for chronic disease man-
agement and preventive services will increase 
the compensation to primary care physicians 
for the time they spend with patients, these 
payment models also presume or require that 
primary care physicians will significantly change 
the way they provide care for patients . Just as 
Recommendation 6 .2 calls for recognition by 
hospitals and specialty providers of the need to 
transition to a smaller or different role in health 
care, primary care physicians will need to plan 
for the transition to a larger and more signifi-
cant role in a value-driven health care system . 
Small physician practices are likely to face 
the most significant challenges in making this 
transition . Since the majority of primary care 
physicians in the country are in small practices, 
new payment systems for primary and chronic 
care will not be successful unless small physician 
practices can make the transition successfully. As 
noted under Recommendation 1 .1, there is cur-
rently no proven formula or standard for how 
to do this, and innovative approaches need to 
be supported to facilitate a better understand-
ing of what will and will not work.
At a minimum, small practices will need technical 
assistance in redesigning their care processes and 
setting up systems for managing new forms of 
payment . In addition, the ability of small practices 
to efficiently and effectively deliver care will likely 
be enhanced if they can work with other small 
practices through collaborative organizational 
structures . For example, Blue Cross Blue Shield 
of Michigan’s Physician Group Practice Incen-
tive Program and Patient Centered Medical 
Home Program are helping small practices form 
or utilize collaborative organizations for quality 
measurement and improvement and for sharing 
resources such as care managers .
Primary care practices of any size will likely 
need to incur additional costs and experience 
temporary reductions in revenues as they 
purchase and install new infrastructure and 
reorganize their care processes to deliver bet-
ter, higher-value care . Although these will create 
short-term financial challenges for all practices, 
the challenges will likely be greater for small 
practices. As a result, special financial assistance 
will be helpful to small physician practices in 
order to meet these challenges and successfully 
transition to better care delivery .
 (Additional information on the issues and op-
tions discussed in reaching this recommendation is 
available under Issue 7.3 in the Summit Framing 
Paper.)
R
ecom
m
endations of the 2008 N
R
H
I H
ealthcare Paym
ent R
eform
 Sum
m
it
5
F R O M  V O L U M E  TO  VA L U E
Transforming Health Care Payment and Delivery Systems to Improve Quality and Reduce Costs
V I I .   C o m m u n i t y - W i d e  S t r u c t u r e s  
t o  S u p p o r t  P a y m e n t  R e f o r m
Markets other than health care have a va-riety of structures to facilitate and regu-
late transactions among market participants 
and to protect consumers, such as consumer 
protection bureaus and financial rating agencies. 
These structures and systems are independent 
of individual buyers and sellers but are designed 
to support them in their dealings in the market-
place .
Similarly, a variety of structures and activi-
ties will be needed to facilitate the transition 
to new health care payment systems . Many 
of these are not specific to any one payer 
or provider and could be facilitated through 
regional, state or national organizations other 
than payers and providers . The participants 
at the NRHI Summit on Healthcare Payment 
Reform identified some of the most impor-
tant of these and developed the following 
recommendations .
Recommendation 7.: Neutral public-
private organizations at the regional or state 
level should encourage and assist payers to 
align their payment structures.
 The appropriate organization and geo-
graphic level will depend on the specific 
structure of the health care system in a 
particular location and the existence of re-
gional health care collaboratives or other 
similar organizations.
 Involvement of a broad range of stake-
holders is highly desirable, but efforts to 
ensure representation of all interested 
parties should not be allowed to unnec-
essarily delay implementation or limit the 
extent of the innovations pursued.
a.
b.
As noted under Recommendations 1 .1, 2 .1 and 
5 .5, participation by all or most payers, and their 
use of similar, if not identical, payment struc-
tures, will be important to the success of new 
payment models . However, because of antitrust 
concerns, even if payers are willing to agree on 
a common payment structure, it will be difficult 
or impossible for them to have direct discus-
sions to achieve that agreement . 
To address this, neutral organizations should 
provide a forum for developing payment 
reform proposals with input from payers, 
purchasers, providers, consumers and others . 
Purchasers, consumers and community leaders 
can then encourage each payer to adopt and 
implement the consensus proposals, thereby 
achieving the desired alignment of payment 
systems .
The appropriate organization to do this will 
vary from region to region . One option is for a 
nonprofit organization to play this role; another 
is for state government to do so . For example, 
in Minnesota the Institute for Clinical Systems 
Improvement worked with payers to develop 
multipayer support for the DIAMOND initia-
tive to improve the quality of care for patients 
with depression . In Pennsylvania, the Governor’s 
Office of Health Care Reform worked with 
payers to develop a multipayer demonstration 
of the chronic care model in the southeastern 
corner of the state . In Rhode Island, Quality 
Partners of Rhode Island worked with payers 
to develop a multipayer initiative to implement 
the advanced medical home and chronic care 
model . 
Ideally, the organizations or groups playing these 
roles will involve a wide range of stakeholders 
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from both the public and private sectors . How-
ever, with broader involvement, it may be more 
difficult to achieve unanimity on all aspects of 
payment changes . Particularly in the case of 
pilot projects, a key goal is to identify problems 
and unintended consequences through the 
implementation process, so it will be impor-
tant to not let the desire to achieve consensus 
trump the goal of implementing truly innovative 
reforms .
 (Additional information on the issues and op-
tions discussed in reaching this recommendation is 
available under Issue 6.3 in the Summit Framing 
Paper.)
Recommendation 7.: Systems for re-
porting on the quality and cost of health care 
providers and services should be established 
at the regional or state level in order to help 
payers and consumers identify higher-value 
providers and services, but the methodologies 
used should be consistent across the nation 
to the maximum extent possible.
As noted in earlier recommendations, a funda-
mental complement to a new payment system 
is an effective mechanism for measuring and 
reporting to the public the quality and cost of 
health care providers and services . A growing 
number of regions and states have created or-
ganizations to perform this function . This trend 
needs to continue, and adequate and predict-
able financial support needs to be available 
to both start and maintain the programs and 
disseminate their results to the public .
Although the data collection and reporting 
systems should be managed by organizations at 
the regional or state level, the methodologies 
they use for collection, auditing, severity-adjust-
ment, etc . should ideally be consistent across 
the country . This does not mean that regional 
or state organizations should wait for national 
standards in order to move forward . Indeed, the 
innovations in developing methodologies have 
come from the regional and state organizations 
that have pioneered the field. But as experience 
with the methodologies grows, it would be 
desirable to achieve consistency across regions 
and states both to facilitate inter-regional com-
parisons and to simplify the reporting processes 
for multiregion providers . The Quality Alli-
ance Steering Committee (QASC), which was 
formed in 2006 as a voluntary, multistakeholder 
collaboration to provide national coordination 
for activities designed to enable value-driven 
health care (www.brookings.edu/projects/qasc.
aspx), could play an important role in encour-
aging common standards without slowing 
progress or deterring innovation . 
(Additional information on the issues and options 
discussed in reaching this recommendation is 
available under Issue 8.1 in the Summit Framing 
Paper.)
Recommendation 7.: Aggressive efforts 
are needed to educate consumers about the 
critical need for new payment systems and 
more value-driven care and to actively involve 
consumers in the process of designing and 
monitoring implementation of changes in pay-
ment and care.
 The case for change and the urgency 
for action need to be described in ways 
that more effectively demonstrate their 
relevance and importance for consumers, 
and proactive marketing and communica-
tion efforts are needed to disseminate that 
information.
 Consumer surveys and consumer advisory 
committees are desirable but insufficient 
methods for involving consumers. A more 
fundamental paradigm shift is needed in 
which consumers are actively involved in 
a.
b.
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the definition of “quality” and “value,” the 
design and evaluation of payment systems 
to support delivery of high-value services, 
and management of their own health.
Although the issues in designing and imple-
menting payment reforms are understandably 
focused on providers and payers, the funda-
mental goal of payment reforms is to improve 
the quality and affordability of care for consum-
ers and patients . It is quite conceivable that 
a new payment and care delivery structure 
could be developed that is perfectly satisfactory 
from the perspectives of payers and providers 
but unacceptable to a significant number of 
consumers and patients, either because of the 
actual problems it creates for them or because 
of the problems they perceive it will create for 
them . The history of managed care systems in 
the United States demonstrates that consumer 
acceptance of payment and care delivery sys-
tems can be critically important .
Consumers first need to understand the need 
for change in both care delivery systems and 
payment systems and the importance of mov-
ing aggressively to implement these changes . 
Although there is growing recognition by health 
care professionals of the key role that health 
care payment systems play in fostering the cost 
and quality problems plaguing the health care 
system, this causal relationship is not widely un-
derstood by consumers . For example, although 
research has shown that more care and higher 
costs do not result in better patient outcomes, 
it’s likely that most consumers still believe that 
they do . Moreover, merely producing informa-
tion for consumers is not enough . Truly proac-
tive efforts to ensure that consumers receive 
and understand the information are critical 
to success, since a core component of a truly 
value-driven health care system is a greater 
consumer role in decision making about provid-
ers and services .
However, efforts to engage consumers need to 
go well beyond one-way communication about 
what health care professionals feel is needed . 
Consumers need to be actively involved in the 
planning and implementation of changes, since 
they will not only reap the rewards of success 
but bear the brunt of failure . Genuine involve-
ment of consumers means more than merely 
surveying them for their opinion or having 
token consumer representatives on advisory 
committees . An entirely new paradigm is need-
ed . In particular, if consumers are going to be 
asked to choose providers based on value and 
pay more for using lower-value providers, then 
it will be important for “value” to be defined 
based on what consumers believe is value, not 
just what health plans or other payers define 
as value . Similarly, if providers are going to be 
paid based on outcomes, since many outcomes 
depend as much on what consumers do (e .g ., 
adherence to medication regimens) as what 
providers do, clear definitions of the roles and 
responsibilities of consumers in management of 
their health will be needed, defined in ways that 
consumers believe is feasible and appropriate 
for them to carry out .
(Additional information on the issues and options 
discussed in reaching this recommendation is 
available under Issues 8.2 and 8.3 in the Summit 
Framing Paper.)
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V I I I .   S u p p o r t i n g  R e g i o n a l  a n d  S t a t e  
P a y m e n t  R e f o r m  E f f o r t s
Regions and states are already moving forward to design and implement pay-
ment reforms . The systems for delivering and 
paying for health care differ dramatically from 
region to region, so initiating payment reforms 
at the regional or state level is appropriate . 
However, this does not mean that payment 
reform should be a parochial enterprise . 
Regional initiatives across the country should 
work to coordinate their efforts, and national 
organizations should support the development, 
evaluation and replication of regional payment 
demonstrations .
Recommendation 8.: The federal gov-
ernment should provide funding to support 
regionally defined pilot projects and should 
authorize participation by Medicare.
 The Department of Health and Human 
Services could accelerate efforts to imple-
ment payment reforms by providing fund-
ing support to regional collaboratives and 
other organizations to take the actions 
needed to design pilot projects.
 Because of the importance of having as 
many payers as possible participating in 
payment reform projects, Congress should 
authorize Medicare to participate in re-
gionally defined pilot projects.
A number of regional organizations are inter-
ested and willing to push for payment reforms 
in their areas and play lead roles in educating, 
convening and involving payers, purchasers and 
consumers as envisioned in Recommendations 
6.1, 7.1 and 7.3 and/or providing the kinds of 
technical assistance and support to providers 
as envisioned in Recommendations 6 .2 and 6 .3 . 
a.
b.
However, substantial time, energy and expertise 
are needed to play these roles effectively, and 
financial support is needed from sources other 
than providers and payers . The federal govern-
ment, as well as national foundations, could 
help accelerate the payment reform process by 
providing financial assistance to regional collab-
oratives and other organizations willing to play 
these roles .
In addition, as Recommendation 5.5 makes 
clear, participation in payment reform pilots 
by the largest payers can be critical to their 
success . For many providers, Medicare is one of 
the largest payers for their patients . Although 
Medicare has been proactive about developing 
payment reforms and is currently pursuing cut-
ting-edge demonstrations of payment concepts 
similar to those recommended at the NRHI 
summits, these demonstrations are defined by 
Medicare alone and generally do not involve 
other payers in the locations where they are 
implemented . Consequently, it would be desir-
able if Medicare could also participate in region-
ally defined pilot projects, joining together with 
other payers to create the critical mass of payer 
involvement called for in Recommendation 5 .5 . 
This will likely require both enabling legislation 
from Congress and funding to enhance the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ 
capacity to engage in multiple, additional pilot 
projects .
Recommendation 8.: The Network 
for Regional Healthcare Improvement should 
support regions in pursuing payment reform 
through information sharing and advocacy.
 NRHI should hold another Summit on 
Healthcare Payment Reform in 2009, with 
a.
R
ecom
m
endations of the 2008 N
R
H
I H
ealthcare Paym
ent R
eform
 Sum
m
it

F R O M  V O L U M E  TO  VA L U E
Transforming Health Care Payment and Delivery Systems to Improve Quality and Reduce Costs
a focus on sharing regions’ experiences in 
designing and implementing value-based 
payment systems and pilot projects.
 NRHI should organize and support advo-
cacy efforts for national actions needed to 
support regional payment reform efforts.
 NRHI should establish a national learning 
network for regions pursuing payment 
reform initiatives.
The purpose of pilot payment reform proj-
ects is to identify and solve problems and 
unintended consequences and overcome 
b.
c.
implementation challenges. It makes no sense 
for regions and states to reinvent the wheel 
if they can learn from the experiences of 
others. The Network for Regional Healthcare 
Improvement has attempted to foster infor-
mation sharing about payment reforms and 
care delivery improvements through its two 
Summits on Healthcare Payment Reform and 
its Learning Network, and the participants at 
the 2008 summit urged that NRHI continue 
and expand those efforts in the future . The 
participants also called for NRHI to play a 
role in organizing and supporting advocacy 
efforts for national actions, such as those de-
fined in Recommendations 7.2 and 8.1.
R
ecom
m
endations of the 2008 N
R
H
I H
ealthcare Paym
ent R
eform
 Sum
m
it
40
F R O M  V O L U M E  TO  VA L U E
Transforming Health Care Payment and Delivery Systems to Improve Quality and Reduce Costs
I X .   C o n c l u s i o n :  M o v i n g  
F r o m  C o n c e p t  t o  R e a l i t y
Major changes in health care payment systems are essential in order to achieve 
the kinds of improvements in health care quality 
and the kinds of reductions in health care costs 
that the nation badly needs . These changes will 
require a significant investment of time and ef-
fort by all participants in the health care system, 
and these participants will face a number of 
significant challenges. However, as the recom-
mendations in this report demonstrate, there 
are ways to overcome the challenges . 
Ultimately, the ability to make the changes in 
both payment systems and health care delivery 
that are envisioned here will depend on the 
support and engagement of all of the stake-
holders in the health care system—citizens, 
payers, providers, purchasers, regional coalitions, 
government officials and others. The exten-
sive and enthusiastic participation of so many 
stakeholders in the NRHI summits, and their 
ability to reach consensus on the types of bold 
recommendations described in this report, 
should be a cause for optimism that the kind of 
support and interest needed for true reform 
of health care payment systems may now be in 
place .
NRHI is committed to carrying out the roles 
described in Recommendation 8 .2 and more 
generally to increasing public and leadership 
awareness of the need for payment reform and 
the ways it can be supported . NRHI welcomes 
both suggestions and support from other 
organizations to help it do so as successfully as 
possible .
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A p p e n d i x  A :   S y n o p s i s  o f  t h e  
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  o f  t h e  2 0 0 7 
N R H I  S u m m i t  o n  H e a l t h c a r e 
P a y m e n t  R e f o r m 
The following is a synopsis of some of the key recommendations from the 2007 
NRHI Summit on Healthcare Payment Reform . 
More details on the recommendations are 
available in the report, “Incentives for Excel-
lence: Rebuilding the Healthcare Payment 
System From the Ground Up,” published by the 
Jewish Healthcare Foundation and available at 
www .nrhi .org/summit .html . 
Paying for Major Acute Episodes
Participants at the 2007 summit recommended 
using episode-of-care payment for major acute 
episodes such as a heart attack or a broken 
or arthritic hip, which are characterized by the 
patient needing a complex mix of often ex-
pensive interventions within a relatively brief 
period of time . For example, once a patient has 
a heart attack, under an episode-of-care pay-
ment system a single payment would be made 
to a health care provider or group of provid-
ers for all of the care needed by that patient 
for the heart attack. This single payment is also 
frequently called a case rate, i .e ., there is a single 
payment for the case rather than multiple fees 
paid separately to multiple providers for each of 
the specific services provided within that case.
The following specific elements of this system 
were recommended:
 A single, bundled, episode-of-care payment 
would be paid to a group of providers to 
cover all of the services needed by the pa-
tient during the episode of care . (Combin-
ing the payments for multiple providers into 
a single payment is generally referred to as 
•
“bundling” payment .) This case rate would 
be paid instead of individual fees or DRG 
payments .
 The group of providers would include all of 
the hospitals, physicians, home health care 
agencies, etc . involved in the patient’s care 
for that episode . The providers would be 
encouraged to create joint arrangements 
for accepting and dividing up the episode-
of-care payment among themselves .
 The amount of the episode-of-care pay-
ment would vary based on the patient’s 
diagnosis and other patient-specific fac-
tors . However, there would be no increase 
in payment to cover preventable adverse 
events such as errors and infections .
 The amount of the episode-of-care pay-
ment would be prospectively defined (i.e., 
it would be established before the care 
actually took place), but would include a 
retrospective adjustment based on the 
level of outcomes achieved by the provider 
group . For example, if the provider group 
had an unusually high mortality rate, even 
after adjusting for patient severity and risk, 
its payment would be reduced . There would 
be some adjustments in payment made 
for cases requiring unusually high levels of 
service, but only if improved outcomes 
were achieved through those higher levels 
of service .
 A regional collaborative organization would 
estimate the cost of providing good-quality 
•
•
•
•
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care for each type of patient, but provider 
groups would bid and negotiate the amount 
of the actual episode-of-care payment they 
would receive for each type of patient and 
condition .
 Patients would receive incentives to use 
higher-quality/lower-cost providers and 
would also receive incentives to adhere 
•
to care processes jointly developed by the 
patients and providers .
An example of how this system might work for 
an individual patient is described in the sidebar . 
Why would this be better than current pay-
ment systems?
 Hospitals would have an incentive to pre-
vent adverse events, prevent readmissions, 
and use the right combination of in-patient 
and post-acute care .
 Physicians would no longer be paid more 
for longer hospital stays, more procedures 
and adverse events .
 Physicians and hospitals would have an 
incentive to cooperate in optimizing care 
quality and cost .
 Providers would have the funding flexibility 
to use the best combination of facilities and 
services for maximum value . 
 Patients would have an incentive to choose 
the facility and services that provide the best 
value (i .e ., better quality and/or lower cost) .
Paying for Chronic Disease Care
For many patients, their condition does not 
end in a fixed period of time; they may need 
care over an extended period of time . For 
example, people with chronic diseases such as 
asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
(COPD), congestive heart failure (CHF) and 
diabetes will generally live with those condi-
tions for the rest of their lives . Many of them 
are hospitalized multiple times with no funda-
mental change in their underlying condition . But 
the rates at which they are hospitalized can be 
significantly affected by the type of care they 
receive outside the hospital . 
•
•
•
•
•
Ms. Brown falls and breaks her hip and goes into the hospital 
for surgery to implant a prosthetic hip. Each of the hospitals 
in the community has defined a price that it will charge Ms. 
Brown’s insurance company for performing the surgery and 
providing all of the postoperative care for a woman of Ms. 
Brown’s age and health status. That price will cover Ms. Brown’s 
hospital care, her surgeon’s fees, the cost of her prosthetic hip, 
her care by any other physicians who are involved (e.g., anes-
thesiologists, intensivists, etc.), her post-hospital rehabilitation 
and any home care she may need to make sure she can return 
home safely. The hospital will be responsible for dividing up the 
payment among all of those providers. If Ms. Brown develops 
an infection in the hospital following surgery, the hospital and 
its physicians will be responsible for treating that infection at 
no additional charge.
The insurance company measures the outcomes (e.g., mor-
tality rate, complication rate, infection rate, range of motion 
following rehab, etc.) that the hospital achieves for hip replace-
ments on patients similar to Ms. Brown. It then adjusts the 
payment to the hospital up or down by a certain percentage 
based on whether its outcomes for Ms. Brown are above or 
below the standard it has established. 
Ms. Brown will be responsible for paying for a portion of her 
care. The amount she pays will be lower if she selects a hospital 
that charges a price lower than the average of other hospitals 
in the area and/or with quality ratings above the average for 
the region for patients similar to her.
Ms. Brown receives a small rebate on her share of the costs of 
her care if she achieves the rehabilitation goals and complies 
with the post-discharge plan that she develops jointly with her 
physicians.
How Episode-of-Care Payment 
Would Work in a Hypothetical Case
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For these patients, paying for each hospital-
ization on an episode-of-care basis may help 
to control the costs of each hospitalization, 
but it does nothing to control the number of 
episodes (hospitalizations) that the person 
experiences. Moreover, there will likely not 
be a clear endpoint to each episode, making 
the definition of the payment for the episode 
particularly challenging. Therefore, it makes 
sense to pay providers for all of the care 
that the patient needs over a fixed period of 
time, including as many or few episodes as 
are needed during that period of time . This 
approach can be called condition-specific 
capitation or risk-adjusted global fees . Condi-
tion-specific capitation means that while there 
is a single payment for a patient, the amount 
of that payment varies depending on the 
specific condition that the patient has, unlike 
traditional capitation systems that pay the 
same amount for each patient regardless of 
how many or what types of conditions they 
have . The term “global” is intended merely to 
indicate that all providers and all services are 
covered by a single fee or payment . Regard-
less of the name, the idea is that the provider 
is paid a case rate rather than individual 
service fees . In contrast to episode-of-care 
payment, though, the case rate is for an inher-
ently arbitrary period of time (e .g ., a calendar 
year), rather than being defined by a resolu-
tion to the patient’s condition . 
The following specific elements of this system 
were recommended:
 A periodic (e .g ., monthly or quarterly) 
comprehensive care payment would be paid 
to a group of providers to cover all of the 
care management, preventive care and minor 
acute services associated with the patient’s 
chronic illness in place of all current fees for 
those services . Major acute care and long-
term care would be paid separately .
•
 The amount of the comprehensive care 
payment would vary based on the patient’s 
characteristics—both the specific chronic 
illness they have and other factors affecting 
the level of health care services they will 
need .
 The set of services to be covered by the 
comprehensive care payment would be 
determined by a regional collaborative orga-
nization . The regional collaborative organiza-
tion would also estimate the cost of provid-
ing those services for each type of patient, 
but provider groups would bid and negotiate 
the actual comprehensive care payment they 
would receive .
 The provider group would receive payment 
bonuses or penalties based on (a) health 
outcomes for patients, (b) patient satisfac-
tion levels, and (c) patient utilization of major 
acute care services .
 Patients would receive incentives to use 
higher-quality/lower-cost providers and 
would also receive incentives to adhere 
to care processes jointly developed by the 
patients and providers .
An example of how this system might work for 
an individual patient is described in the sidebar . 
Why would such a system be better?
 Physicians would no longer be restricted by 
fee codes and amounts as to what services 
they can provide and be paid for . 
 Physicians would have an incentive to main-
tain or improve a patient’s health, prevent 
hospital admissions and coordinate care 
among multiple providers .
 Physicians would have the funding flexibility 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
R
ecom
m
endations of the 2008 N
R
H
I H
ealthcare Paym
ent R
eform
 Sum
m
it
44
F R O M  V O L U M E  TO  VA L U E
Transforming Health Care Payment and Delivery Systems to Improve Quality and Reduce Costs
to use the best combination of providers 
and services for maximum value .
 Patients would have an incentive to 
choose providers and services that 
provide the best value (i .e ., better qual-
ity and/or lower cost) and to adhere to 
recommended care .
Implementing Payment Changes
Moving from the current payment systems 
to these proposed new payment systems 
will be a complex and challenging endeavor . 
But participants at the 2007 NRHI summit 
agreed that this transition was essential in or-
der to achieve efficient, effective and sustain-
able improvements in the quality and costs 
of the health care system, and they made 
several recommendations as to how the 
concepts outlined above should be advanced 
towards implementation:
 Payment systems need to be improved 
without increasing overall health care 
costs. Many studies have shown high lev-
els of waste and unnecessary services in 
health care systems, and establishing pay-
ment systems that encourage the reduc-
tion of waste and unnecessary services 
could reduce health care costs as well as 
improve quality . However, the transition 
to a new payment system and to the or-
ganizational structures needed to support 
it, even if it reduces costs and improves 
quality in the long run, will likely require 
significant transition costs for both payers 
and providers . 
 The goals of payment system changes 
need to be clearly defined. Changes in 
payment systems are not ends in them-
selves but means to achieving improved 
health care quality and lower costs . 
Therefore, the success of a new payment 
•
•
•
Mr. Jones has diabetes. His insurance company pays his primary care 
provider a monthly comprehensive care payment to help him man-
age his diabetes and address some of the complications that might 
arise from his condition. 
Mr. Jones’ primary care provider has physicians, nurse practitioners 
and other staff working as a team to help with Mr. Jones. In addition, 
they have relationships with other health care providers that will 
need to provide some aspects of Mr. Jones’ care, such as laborato-
ries and ophthalmologists. Mr. Jones’ primary care provider works 
with him to develop a plan of care that defines the actions that he 
can and will take (e.g., exercising, managing his diet, taking medica-
tions, etc.) as well as the actions that the provider will take (e.g., 
contacting him regularly by phone to see how he is doing, seeing 
him periodically to check his blood glucose and hemoglobin levels, 
checking his feet at every visit, etc.) in order to successfully manage 
his diabetes. Mr. Jones understands that he does not need to see a 
doctor each time he comes to the office for checkups, since a nurse 
practitioner can perform all of the necessary checks and call in a 
physician when needed. 
The costs of blood tests and any visits to specialists that Mr. Jones 
needs, such as periodic eye examinations by an ophthalmologist, are 
all paid by his primary care provider from the monthly comprehen-
sive care payment.
Mr. Jones pays no co-payments for his regular checkups or routine 
testing. He receives a small cash payment from his insurance com-
pany if he meets the goals established in his care plan as measured 
by objective test results, such as hemoglobin A1c levels. His primary 
care provider also receives a financial bonus from the insurance 
company if Mr. Jones meets the goals in the care plan.
The insurance company measures the number of hospitalizations 
that occur related to diabetes for Mr. Jones and other patients like 
him who are under the care of the primary care provider. If the 
rate of hospitalizations is below a predetermined target level, the 
primary care provider receives a financial bonus, since they have 
saved the insurer money. 
Mr. Jones is free to switch to another primary care provider at any 
time if he isn’t happy with the care he is receiving. However, if he 
switches to a provider that has significantly poorer outcomes, rates 
of hospitalizations and/or higher prices for care, his insurance com-
pany will require him to pay more in order to use that provider.
How Condition-Specific Capitation 
Would Work in a Hypothetical Case
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system is not determined by whether 
it is implemented as designed but by 
whether it achieves the goals that were 
intended . Consequently, it is essential that 
clear goals—in terms of improved quality, 
reduced cost or both—are established as 
part of any change in payment systems .
 Pilot tests and demonstrations of new 
payment systems should be developed, 
implemented and evaluated in order to 
make progress on payment reform. Even 
where there is agreement on the general 
structure of improved payment systems, 
there are many details to be worked out. In 
other cases, there is insufficient knowledge 
or experience to identify the preferred op-
tion. There will likely be unintended con-
sequences and unexpected difficulties that 
need to be identified and rectified before 
broad-based implementation is warranted, 
and there will likely be differences in the 
structure of payment systems needed from 
region to region in response to differences 
in the number and type of providers avail-
able . Consequently, a wide variety of pay-
ment demonstrations are needed .
 Demonstrations should be developed and 
implemented at the regional level. The 
systems for delivering and paying for health 
care differ dramatically from region to re-
gion . However, this does not mean that pay-
ment reform should be a parochial enter-
prise . Regional initiatives across the country 
should work to coordinate their efforts, and 
national organizations should support the 
development, evaluation and replication of 
regional payment demonstrations .
 Incentives should be aligned across 
multiple payers within the constraints of 
antitrust laws. It is difficult, if not impossible, 
for health care providers to redesign their 
•
•
•
processes of care to respond to improved 
payment system incentives if only a small 
subset of payers change their approach to 
payment . Moreover, if most payers change 
payment systems in ways that are similar 
but different in the details, it will be more 
difficult and expensive for providers to re-
spond . Although having multiple payers and 
multiple providers agree to use the same 
payment structure would still allow compe-
tition on price, it will be important to insure 
that discussions and agreements on changes 
in payment systems are carried out in ways 
that are permissible under federal and state 
antitrust laws .
 Regional health care collaboratives should 
take the lead in payment restructuring 
wherever possible. Because both payers’ 
payment systems and providers’ processes 
of care need to change in order to achieve 
the goals of improved quality and reduced 
cost, a neutral convener can help reach 
consensus on payment system changes that 
are workable for both payers and provid-
ers, as well as patients . Regional health care 
collaboratives, where they exist, can play a 
key role in finding win-win solutions for pay-
ment reform .
 Improvements should be made in pro-
vider capacity and coordination as well 
as in payment systems. The ability to 
implement many improvements in pay-
ment systems will be dependent on having 
providers operating in a coordinated fash-
ion with the capacity to do sophisticated 
patient care management . Conversely, 
the ability and willingness of providers 
to coordinate their efforts and improve 
patient care will depend on having sup-
portive payment systems . Consequently, 
in addition to developing demonstrations 
of payment system changes, there will 
•
•
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also need to be efforts to encourage and 
assist providers to make investments in 
improved care management infrastructure 
(e.g., staffing and information systems) and 
to enter into coordination agreements 
with other providers for both payment 
and quality improvement .
 Improvements will be needed in outcome 
measurement and risk adjustment mecha-
nisms. Creating payment systems that focus 
•
more on outcomes will require improved sys-
tems of measuring outcomes and improved 
systems of categorizing different levels of 
patient risk and severity associated with differ-
ent levels of health care services required to 
achieve those outcomes . Although research 
programs and consensus-building systems for 
this exist at both the regional and national 
levels, the scope and speed of these systems 
will likely need to be increased in order to 
support improved payment systems .
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